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And if a person sin, and hear the voice of adjuration, and is a wit-
ness, whether he has seen or known of it; if he do not utter it, then 
he shall bear his iniquity.1 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
 Jack Defendant is being prosecuted in state court. The case 
against him was made by Detectives Smith and Jones. The prosecu-
tor calls Smith to the stand, elicits his testimony, then rests without 
calling Jones. This tactic nourishes a suspicion that has been grow-
ing in the mind of Jack’s defense counsel that there is something 
                                                                                                                    
 * B.A., University of California, 1974; J.D., Georgetown University, 1982. The au-
thor gratefully acknowledges the contributions made in the preparation of this article by 
Roy Kahn, Robert Kuntz, and Joshua Zelman. 
 1.  Leviticus 5:1.  This passage is understood to mean that anyone who is summoned 
as a witness, and who, having knowledge of the case, refuses to testify, shall be accursed. 
In this verse, the principle was established in Jewish law that every person who 
has knowledge of relevant facts has a duty to testify, and if he withholds his tes-
timony he is guilty of a transgression. According to the plain meaning of the 
verse, this obligation applies to all factual information acquired in any manner, 
whether as an eyewitness or by any other means. . . . 
MENACHEM ELON, JEWISH LAW 283 (English ed. 1994).  
 The “voice of adjuration” (in Hebrew, kol alah) remonstrates not with the sinner, but 
with the witness, urging him to testify. The word “subpoena”—a command, under penalty 
of law, to bear witness or produce evidence—conveys a similar meaning. 
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fishy about the case against Jack. Perhaps, if offered just the right 
questions, Jones might contradict or at least undercut Smith’s testi-
mony. 
 Deciding whether to call Detective Jones as a defense witness will 
be difficult. Giving effect to that decision will be easy. Defense coun-
sel need do no more than subpoena Jones; or, if Jones is waiting for 
Smith in the courthouse hallway, simply announce, “The defense 
calls Detective Jones.” 
 Across the street, Jill Defendant is being prosecuted in federal 
court. The case against her was made by Agents Smith and Jones. 
The Assistant United States Attorney calls Smith to the stand, elicits 
his testimony, then rests without calling Jones. This tactic nourishes 
a suspicion that has been growing in the mind of Jill’s defense coun-
sel that there is something fishy about the case against Jill. Perhaps, 
if offered just the right questions, Jones might contradict or at least 
undercut Smith’s testimony. 
 Deciding whether to call Agent Jones as a defense witness will be 
difficult. Giving effect to that decision will be next to impossible. In 
attempting to subpoena Agent Jones, Jill’s lawyer will subject him-
self and his client to the Kafkaesque legal provisions of 28 C.F.R. §§ 
16.22-16.29.2 When the federal judge impatiently demands to know if 
the defense plans to call any witnesses, Jill’s attorney will explain 
that his subpoena to Agent Jones came back with a letter from the 
U.S. Attorney’s Office. The U.S. Attorney’s Office insists that, pursu-
ant to the cited regulations, the subpoena cannot be considered until 
defense counsel states in writing what testimony he expects to elicit 
from Agent Jones. Once that information is provided, the subpoena 
will be routed to the appropriate authorities in the Department of 
Justice for further consideration. All this may take some time. Per-
haps, suggests defense counsel very meekly, His Honor would inter-
vene? After all, Jill has a Sixth Amendment right to compulsory 
process and Jill’s lawyer ought not to have to divulge his theory of 
the case to his adversary in order to effectuate that right—should he? 
 But His Honor is unhelpful. His Honor explains that these regula-
tions are routinely relied upon by agencies within the Department of 
Justice, and kindred regulations by other federal agencies. In the 
meantime, notes His Honor pointedly, the jury is being kept waiting. 
Does defense counsel have a witness available or does he not? And if 
no witness is available, should the trial not proceed to closing argu-
ment? 
 If Jill is bewildered, she has every right to be. The notion that 
“regulations”—dreary, fustian prose drafted in the chiaroscuro re-
                                                                                                                    
 2. 28 C.F.R §§ 16.22-16.29 (2001). 
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cesses of some federal bureaucracy, never submitted to the light of 
legislative debate, collected in a “Code” as succinct and readable as 
the Detroit telephone directory—have the power to paralyze Jill’s 
constitutionally-guaranteed right to compulsory process is indeed 
bewildering. Such a notion cannot be the law. Such a notion is not 
the law. Such a notion, however, is widely believed to be the law—
believed even by some federal judges. 
 It was not always so. The first part of this Article considers the 
early history in this country of the right to compulsory process. 
American courts, state and federal, energetically enforced the com-
pulsory process rights of criminal defendants, discountenancing 
claims by executive-branch officers of any privilege or immunity from 
process. The Aaron Burr litigation3 is both entertaining and instruc-
tive on this point. 
 In modern American jurisprudence, the opinion of the United 
States Supreme Court in United States ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen4 is the 
case most cited both by executive-branch agencies in support of their 
regulations and by courts confronted by a demand for evidence with-
held in reliance upon such regulations. Touhy involved a state court 
defendant seeking habeas relief in U.S. district court who caused a 
subpoena duces tecum to be served on the agent in charge of the Chi-
cago FBI office.5 
 Any respectable short list of famous sayings that were never actu-
ally said would have to include: 
 Horace Greeley in the New York Tribune: “Go West, young 
man!”6 
 Humphrey Bogart as Richard Blaine in the movie Casablanca: 
“Play it again, Sam.”7 
                                                                                                                    
 3. See discussion infra Section II.A. 
 4. 340 U.S. 462 (1951). 
 5. Id. at 463-64.  
 6. He never actually said it. John Soule, an Indiana newspaperman, coined that 
phrase in 1851, more than ten years after Greeley wrote in the New York Tribune that, “If 
you have no family or friends to aid you . . . turn your face to the Great West and there 
build up your home and fortune.” See David H. Fenimore, Horace Greeley (1811-1872), Edi-
tor of the New York Tribune, at http://www.honors.unr.edu/~fenimore/greeley.html (last 
visited July 1, 2002) (on file with author). It was the first of many such pronouncements, 
and Soule—in Indiana, a denizen of what then constituted “the West”—kept up with 
Greeley’s papers. 
 7. He never actually said it. E.g., PAUL F. BOLLER, JR. & JOHN GEORGE, THEY NEVER 
SAID IT: A BOOK OF FAKE QUOTES, MISQUOTES AND MISLEADING AUTHORITIES 8-9 (1989). 
See also James Cousineau, Maltese Falcon-Casablanca, at 
http://maltesefalcon.bogart.com/bogart_casablanca.html (last visited July 1, 2002) (on file 
with author); Gihan Perera, Say it Again, Sam: The Best Quotations from Casablanca, at 
http://www.gihanperera.com/home/casablanca.html (last visited July 1, 2002) (on file with 
author) (“The best-known quotation from the world’s greatest film is ‘Play it again, Sam.’ 
Ironically, this quotation never appears in the story—it’s one of the silver screen’s most 
widespread myths.”). 
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 William Shatner as Captain Kirk in the TV show Star Trek: 
“Beam me up, Scotty.”8 
 
 The United States Supreme Court in United States ex rel. Touhy 
v. Ragen: “The Supreme Court has specifically recognized the au-
thority of agency heads to restrict testimony of their subordinates 
by . . . regulation.”9 
Greeley, Bogart, and Shatner said things very like the famous mis-
quotations attributed to them. But the Supreme Court in Touhy 
never said anything akin to the misinterpretation commonly given to 
Touhy. Fifty years after Touhy was propounded, the “Touhy doctrine” 
bears little resemblance to, and cannot be derived from, the Touhy 
opinion. As discussed in the second section of this Article, Touhy did 
no more than recognize a power vested by statute in the heads of ex-
ecutive agencies scarcely broader than that necessary to enable those 
agency heads to designate the custodians of records for their depart-
ments. 
 The last section of this Article considers the cases applying Touhy. 
In civil cases, of course, no Sixth Amendment compulsory process 
right is implicated. The power of a civil litigant to enforce a subpoena 
directed to a federal agent or employee is discussed briefly, largely as 
a proem to the more important (from a standpoint of constitutional 
law) question of the right of a criminal defendant to enforce such a 
subpoena. To the latter question extended consideration is given. The 
inescapable conclusion is that federal courts commonly read Touhy 
out of all proportion, and the Sixth Amendment compulsory process 
power out of all existence. In state courts the issue of sovereign im-
munity is thrown into the mix, resulting in even more confusion. 
 The case of Jill Defendant is anything but hypothetical. The re-
ported opinions confirm what experienced criminal trial practitioners 
know: criminal defendants routinely seek, and are routinely denied, 
evidence and testimony cloistered behind the all-but-impregnable 
barrier of executive agency ukase. A seemingly inconsequential rule 
intended to enable agency heads to manage their departments has 
become an elaborate body of regulations acting in derogation of the 
                                                                                                                    
 8. He never actually said it in the TV series. “Trekkies” are quick to point out, how-
ever, that he did get around to saying it in the fourth Star Trek movie. See Jim Matthews, 
Jim’s Message Boards, at http://www.jimmatthews.startreksites.net/custom.html (last vis-
ited May 28, 2002) (on file with author). 
 9. Tholen Supply Co. v. Cont’l Cas., 859 F. Supp. 467, 469 (D. Kan. 1994); see also 
Ferrell v. Yarberry, 848 F. Supp. 121, 123 (E.D. Ark. 1994) (“[In Touhy, t]he U.S. Supreme 
Court has explicitly recognized the authority of agency heads to restrict testimony of their 
subordinates by regulations . . . .”); Dent v. Packerland Packing Co., 144 F.R.D. 675, 678 
(D. Neb. 1992) (“The United States Supreme Court has specifically recognized the author-
ity of administrators of federal agencies to restrict subordinates from participating in judi-
cial proceedings . . . .”). The Supreme Court has never said anything remotely resembling 
what appears in the foregoing cases—not in Touhy, and not elsewhere. 
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Anglo-American principle that the court is entitled to every man’s 
evidence. That federal judges, particularly in criminal cases, have 
acquiesced in and even embraced the executive agency position is 
most troubling of all. On the occasion of Touhy’s golden anniversary, 
courts would do well to remember the words of President Theodore 
Roosevelt in a 1904 message to Congress: “No man is above the law, 
and no man is below it; nor need we ask any man’s permission when 
we require him to obey it.”10 
II.   THE ROAD TO TOUHY V. RAGEN 
A.   Compulsory Process at Common Law and at the Outset of 
American Constitutional History 
 Although a relative latecomer to the common law,11 the compul-
sory process power was well-recognized in early America, earning a 
place in the national Constitution as well as the constitutions of most 
states.12 The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prose-
cutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor . . .”13—a guarantee made 
applicable as against the states by operation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.14 
 From the earliest days of the Republic it was generally understood 
that no one, however lofty his station, was exempt from the reach of 
the compulsory process rights of even the lowliest defendant. Deriv-
ing the same principle from English cases in 1827, Jeremy Ben-
tham—in much-quoted language that could have come from no pen 
but his—writes: 
What then? Are men of the first rank and consideration, are men 
high in office, men whose time is not less valuable to the public 
than to themselves,—are such men to be forced to quit their busi-
ness, their functions, and what is more than all, their pleasure, at 
the beck of every idle or malicious adversary, to dance attendance 
upon every petty cause? Yes, as far as it is necessary,—they and 
everybody! What if, instead of parties, they were witnesses? Upon 
business of other people’s, everybody is obliged to attend, and no-
body complains of it. Were the Prince of Wales, the Archbishop of 
Canterbury, and the Lord High Chancellor, to be passing by in the 
                                                                                                                    
 10. President Theodore Roosevelt, Third Annual Message (Dec. 7, 1903), in JUSTIN 
KAPLAN, BARTLETT’S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 576 (1992). 
 11. The development of the compulsory process power is traced in JOHN HENRY 
WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2190 
(1904). See also United States v. Reid, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 361, 364-66 (1851); West v. State, 
1 Wis. 209, 230-33 (Wis. 1853); THOMAS STARKIE, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
EVIDENCE 84 (Theron Metcalf et al. eds., 6th Am. ed. 1837). 
 12. WIGMORE, supra note 11, § 2191 & n.1. 
 13. U.S. CONST. amend VI. 
 14. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 15 & n.2 (1967). 
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same coach while a chimney-sweeper and a barrow-woman were in 
dispute about a halfpennyworth of apples, and the chimney-
sweeper or the barrow-woman were to think proper to call upon 
them for their evidence, could they refuse it? No, most certainly.15 
The defendant in United States v. Cooper16 was “indicted for a libel on 
the President.”17 He sought, at a time when Congress was in session, 
to compel the testimony of several congressmen at his trial. Justice 
Chase’s terse opinion includes the following dictum: “The constitu-
tion gives to every man, charged with an offence, the benefit of com-
pulsory process, to secure the attendance of his witnesses. I do not 
know of any privilege to exempt members of congress from the ser-
vice, or the obligations, of a subpoena, in such cases.”18 Similarly, in 
Respublica v. Duane19 the issue was whether the immunity from ar-
rest granted to U.S. congressmen when Congress is in session20 in-
cluded immunity from the compulsory process of a trial subpoena. 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court had no difficulty concluding that it 
did not; the constitutional privilege from arrest is not a general im-
munity from all judicial visitorial powers. The court went further: If 
a congressman were to ignore a subpoena, the constitutional immu-
nity from arrest might not protect him from bodily “attachment . . . 
[for] neglecting or refusing to attend in consequence of a subpoena 
properly served.”21 
 The principle that no man is above the compulsory process of the 
law was burned into our early jurisprudence in figures of fire. In 
1807, Aaron Burr, former Vice President of the United States, was 
tried for treason.22 The trial was presided over by John Marshall, 
then Chief Justice of the United States.23 Burr was lead counsel in 
his own defense, but was assisted by (among others) Luther Martin, 
a legendary legal figure in his time. On June 9, Burr made an appli-
cation to the court: President Jefferson, in a proclamation to Con-
gress the previous November 27, had referred to a letter and other 
                                                                                                                    
 15. WIGMORE, supra note 11, § 2192 (quoting THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 320-
21 (John Bowring ed., 1843)). Both R.P. CROOM-JOHNSON & G.F.L. BRIDGMAN, TAYLOR ON 
EVIDENCE § 1381 n.m (1931), and ANTHONY HAWKE, ROSCOE’S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 132 
(1928) [hereinafter ROSCOE], refer to newspaper reports of the 1911 case of R. v. Mylius, 
that stated, “[T]he A.G. had the King’s authority in writing for saying that he would have 
been a witness had not his law officers advised him that it would be ‘unconstitutional.’”  
 16. 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 341 (C.C.D. Pa. 1800). 
 17. Id. at 341. 
 18. Id. 
 19. 4 Yeates 347 (Pa. 1807). 
 20. U.S. CONST. art I, § 6, cl. 1. (“They shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and 
Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of 
their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same . . . .”). 
 21. Respublica, 4 Yeates at 348. 
 22. See generally United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) [Burr I]; 
United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) [Burr II]. 
 23. Burr I, 25 F. Cas. 30; Burr II, 25 F. Cas. 187.  
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papers received by him from General Wilkinson, the principal wit-
ness against Burr.24 Burr had reason to believe that these papers 
would exculpate him in part, and would demonstrate that the case 
against him was a political plot to discredit and destroy him.25 He 
had applied to the Secretary of the Navy for permission for his coun-
sel to inspect these papers, and had been denied.26 “Hence,” claimed 
Burr, “I feel it necessary . . . to call upon [the court] to issue a sub-
poena to the President of the United States, with a clause, requiring 
him to produce certain papers; or in other words, to issue the sub-
poena duces tecum.”27 
 Debate on the amenability of the President to the court’s sub-
poena power was spirited. Luther Martin and Thomas Jefferson had 
little in common, but one attribute they surely shared: each loathed 
the other to the marrow of his bones. Martin’s biographers recall his 
response to the prosecution’s claim of executive privilege: 
The president has undertaken to prejudge my client by declaring 
that “of his guilt there can be no doubt.” He has assumed . . . the 
knowledge of the Supreme Being himself, and pretended to search 
the heart of my highly respected friend. He has proclaimed him a 
traitor in the face of that country, which has rewarded him. He has 
let slip the dogs of war, the hell-hounds of persecution, to hunt 
down my friend. And would this president of the United States, 
who has raised all this absurd clamour, pretend to keep back the 
papers which are wanted for this trial, where life itself is at stake? 
It is a sacred principle, that in all such cases, the accused has a 
right to all the evidence which is necessary for his defence. And 
whoever withholds, wilfully, information that would save the life of 
a person, charged with a capital offence, is substantially a mur-
derer, and so recorded in the register of heaven.28 
The amenability of the President to subpoena ad testificandum was 
largely conceded;29 the question over which Chief Justice Marshall 
labored was the viability of the duces tecum portion of the subpoena. 
In the end, however, his course was clear. The constitutional guaran-
tee of the right to compulsory process made no exception for presi-
dents: 
It cannot be denied that to issue a subpoena to a person filling the 
exalted station of the Chief Magistrate is a duty which would be 
dispensed with more cheerfully than it would be performed; but, if 
                                                                                                                    
 24. ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 433 (1929). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. PAUL S. CLARKSON & R. SAMUEL JETT, LUTHER MARTIN OF MARYLAND 248 (1970) 
(quoting DAVID ROBERTSON, REPORTS OF THE TRIALS OF COLONEL AARON BURR 127 (Phila-
delphia, Hopkins & Earle 1808)). 
 29. See, e.g., BEVERIDGE, supra note 24, at 445; Burr I, 25 F. Cas. 30, 34 (C.C.D. Va. 
1807). 
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it be a duty, the Court can have no choice in the case. If then, as is 
admitted by the counsel for the United States, a subpoena may is-
sue to the President, the accused is entitled to it of course; and, 
whatever difference may exist with respect to the power to compel 
the same obedience to the process as if it had been directed to a 
private citizen, there exists no difference with respect to the right 
to obtain it.30 
B.   The Revenue Cases 
 As late as 1898, Underhill, in his treatise on criminal evidence, 
could state categorically that “[d]isobedience to a subpoena duces te-
cum by a post office or internal revenue official is not excused by the 
fact that the rules of his department forbid him to disclose any in-
formation contained in its records.”31 The assertion is seemingly un-
remarkable. If, as was established at the outset of the 19th century, 
the highest federal official was not exempt from the obligations of 
subpoenas ad testificandum and duces tecum, surely it was safe to 
                                                                                                                    
 30. WIGMORE, supra note 11, § 2371. Both Marshall in his opinion and Wigmore in his 
treatise leave open the possibility that the administrative responsibilities of the President 
or some other executive officer might oblige the court to modify, or to put limitations upon, 
the time, place, and manner in which the recipient of the subpoena would be obliged to 
comply with it. Jefferson, in response to the Burr subpoena, offered to be examined by 
deposition in Washington rather than in person in far-off (in those days) Richmond, so that 
he could continue to discharge his presidential duties. Id. But there is no suggestion what-
ever that this constitutes a general immunity from, or an exception to, the compulsory 
process rights of litigants. Wigmore cites with approval the following language from a state 
case in which a subpoena was issued to the governor: 
The argument ab inconveniente, that it is necessary the Governor should always 
be at the seat of government, is preposterous, in view of frequent visits else-
where, of business, courtesy, and pleasure. The absence of the Governor in the 
Rocky Mountains, on his way to California, at the time of these riots, is an appo-
site example. 
Appeal of Hartranft, 85 Pa. 433, 457 (Pa. 1877). 
 The notion that the President enjoys no general immunity from compulsory process has 
been affirmed in our own time. See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997); United States v. 
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
 31. H.C. UNDERHILL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 252 (1898). 
This is not to say that Underhill and his contemporaries were unaware of executive privi-
lege. Elsewhere in his treatise, and in seeming contradiction of the statement quoted in the 
text, Underhill observes: 
The common law has always regarded as privileged all information in the posses-
sion of executive officials as such; and has uniformly declined to compel them to 
divulge facts of which they have obtained knowledge in any official capacity. . . . 
In this country the various executive departments of the government, both fed-
eral and state, acting under the power conferred by the legislative branch to for-
mulate rules for the proper conduct of departmental affairs, have forbidden their 
subordinate officials to disclose official information, unless permitted or required 
to do so by their official superiors. 
Id. at § 170. As discussed infra Part V.B.1., the existence of executive privilege (and all 
other evidentiary privileges) is entirely compatible with the notion that no one is above the 
law’s compulsory process power. 
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say at the close of the 19th century that such lowly federal officials as 
post office clerks and internal revenue officers were not exempt. 
 In support of this seemingly unremarkable assertion, Underhill 
cites In re Hirsch.32 Hirsch was one of several cases—among them In 
re Weeks33 and In re Comingore34—in which federal revenue officers 
were served with subpoenas issuing from state courts. In Hirsch, a 
criminal prosecution had been brought against Stephen H. Cole “for 
keeping intoxicating liquors . . . with intent to sell the same unlaw-
fully.”35 Hirsch was subpoenaed in the state case in his capacity as 
deputy United States internal revenue collector  
to testify [as to] his knowledge in said [state] criminal cause, and 
to bring with him any and all papers, applications, or books in his 
possession showing that said Cole had paid a tax to the United 
States, or received a license from the United States for the sale . . . 
of spirituous or intoxicating liquor.36 
 Hirsch did appear and gave some testimony, but refused to pro-
duce the sought-after papers on the grounds of Internal Revenue 
regulations.37 He was then imprisoned for contempt, and sought re-
lief by way of habeas corpus in federal court. That court considered 
and rejected four objections made to the imposition of contempt sanc-
tions upon a federal officer who failed to comply with a state court 
subpoena.38 
 The federal court began its analysis by recognizing that then-
existing § 251 of the Revised Statutes of the United States author-
ized the Secretary of the Treasury “to prescribe rules and regula-
tions, not inconsistent with law, to be used under and in the execu-
tion and enforcement of the various provisions of the revenue laws.”39 
That such regulations would have the force of law “over those to be 
affected thereby” the court did not dispute, citing “the navy and army 
regulations [as illustrative] of this class of rules.”40 The regulation or 
policy upon which Hirsch purported to rely, however, was in the 
court’s view a different matter. The federal court took the curious po-
sition that shielding Hirsch from the reach of the state court’s sub-
poena power would shield the state court defendant from prosecution 
under state law for violation of state liquor statutes. “The govern-
ment of the United States does not undertake to interfere with the 
                                                                                                                    
 32. 74 F. 928 (C.C.D. Conn. 1896). Underhill also cites to a state case, Rice v. Rice, 47 
N.J. Eq. 559 (N.J. 1891). 
 33. 82 F. 729 (D. Vt. 1897). 
 34. 96 F. 552 (D. Ky. 1899). 
 35. In re Hirsch, 74 F. at 928. 
 36. Id. at 931. 
 37. Id. at 929. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 931 (quoting R.S. § 251 (1820) (current version at 19 U.S.C. § 66 (2000)). 
 40. Id. 
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statutory system of a state for the protection of its citizens against 
the unlicensed sale of intoxicating liquor.”41 The Internal Revenue 
regulations or policies were inconsistent with law, or at least with 
the Hirsch court’s notion of federalism, and thus of no effect. 
 The court then considered a position taken in writing by the 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue: that the sought-after records had 
been submitted by taxpayers to a federal agency under compulsion of 
federal law, which compulsion was justified because the records were 
to be used for no other purpose than the collection of revenue.42 Thus 
the records “were privileged, and were for revenue purposes alone, 
and should not be admitted into evidence [in the state criminal 
prosecution].”43 The court rejected this argument after some consid-
eration of the history and nature of the compulsory process power.44 
 The court made short shrift of the argument that compliance with 
subpoenas such as those at bar would impose an insupportable in-
convenience on federal officers such as Hirsch, taking them away 
from their public duties. Such inconvenience, said the court, comes 
                                                                                                                    
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 932. 
 43. Id.  
 44. Id. at 932-33. Perhaps without realizing it, the court was correct in one sense. 
Whether the records in question would have been admissible in the state court proceeding 
against Cole is a question that could have properly been raised by Cole in the state court, 
not by Hirsch (or his boss, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue) in the federal court. At 
the time the Hirsch opinion was written, courts had scarcely begun to develop what is to-
day a byzantine body of jurisprudence regarding the compelled production of business re-
cords. “It used to be thought that if a person was required by the government to yield up an 
incriminating document, this was the equivalent of his being forced . . . to testify against 
himself” in violation of the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination. Smith 
v. Richert, 35 F.3d 300, 301 (7th Cir. 1994) (Posner, C.J.) (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 
U.S. 616 (1886)). This conception of the Fifth Amendment gave rise to the “required re-
cords” doctrine, see, e.g., Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948), which has now been 
largely abandoned. See, e.g., Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976); Commodity Fu-
tures Trading Comm’n v. Collins, 997 F.2d 1230 (7th Cir. 1993). It has been the law since 
at least the time of the Fisher opinion that “the government [can] compel the production of 
nonrequired records, because their creation, and the setting forth of potentially self-
incriminating facts entailed by that creation, were the author’s voluntary choice; the gov-
ernment had not made him give utterance to or record these facts, as it would have done 
had it forced him to testify or beaten a confession out of him.” Smith, 35 F.3d at 302 (em-
phasis omitted). 
 Fisher, however, left open a possibility that was confirmed in United States v. Doe, 465 
U.S. 605, 612 (1984): that “[a]lthough the contents of a document may not be privileged, 
the act of producing the document may be. A government subpoena compels the holder of 
the document to perform an act that may have testimonial aspects and an incriminating 
effect.” This “act of production” doctrine is nowadays limited by something known as the 
“collective entity” doctrine. See Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99 (1988). The collec-
tive entity rule provides that individuals, when acting as representatives of a collective 
group, cannot be said to be exercising their personal rights and duties nor to be entitled to 
their purely personal privileges. Rather, they assume the rights, duties and privileges of 
the artificial entity or association of which they are agents or officers and they are bound 
by its obligations. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 838 F.2d 624, 625 (1st Cir. 
1988). 
2002]                          THE VOICE OF ADJURATION 91 
 
with the territory.45 The court analogized to custodians of records of 
large corporations, whose duties often obliged them to appear in 
court to authenticate documents.46 If private businessmen could bear 
such inconvenience, public servants certainly could. 
 Almost as an afterthought, the court disposed of the point that 
would later prove to be central to this body of jurisprudence. Hirsch 
claimed that he had physical but not legal custody of the demised re-
cords; legal custody reposed in the hands of someone higher up the 
Internal Revenue ladder. The court found, however, that: 
It is not necessary to serve a subpoena upon the person who is 
merely technically in control, but who is not in the town, and not 
in charge of the office where the papers are actually kept. The per-
son in actual possession, as the head of the office where the papers 
are kept, should produce them.47 
 The facts of In re Weeks were substantially similar to those of 
Hirsch. The opinion in Weeks was pithy, but in reaching a contrary 
conclusion to that of Hirsch demonstrated a better understanding of 
federalism, sovereign immunity, and the supremacy of national law: 
When the state lays hold of a federal officer, and his doings as 
such, for proof contrary to his duty in respect to the tax . . . it inter-
feres with the lawful operations of the federal government in lay-
ing and collecting its taxes. The federal government cannot dictate 
as to evidence in state courts, but it cannot be required to provide 
evidence for them; and the state has no right to federal instru-
ments of purely federal character for proof . . . . This is somewhat 
as if a federal district attorney or grand juror should be imprisoned 
to compel disclosure of proceedings before the grand jury, which 
might be very material in a trial elsewhere. This disclosure would 
be contrary to legal duty, as that would be, and . . . quite clearly 
contrary to the laws of the United States.48 
In a cryptic attempt to distinguish Hirsch, the court stated only that 
the Weeks facts differed “in respect to the proof required, and the 
regulations, instructions, and directions shown.”49 Whatever this was 
supposed to mean, Hirsch and Weeks clearly pointed in opposite di-
rections. 
 For the district judge in In re Comingore,50 the decisive factor was 
the nature of the Internal Revenue forms themselves. 
These reports [which were] made to the collector in the course of 
administering the laws of the United States, and for this executive 
                                                                                                                    
 45. Hirsch, 74 F. at 934. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 935. 
 48. In re Weeks, 82 F. 729, 732 (D. Vt. 1897). 
 49. Id. 
 50. 96 F. 552 (D. Ky. 1899). 
92  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:81 
 
purpose alone, are now demanded of him by the state officials in 
the manner before shown. . . . So far as the information contained 
in the reports is obtained from the distiller, it is extorted for the 
sole purpose of enabling the United States to ascertain and collect 
from him its revenues. This purpose is all that relieves . . . this act 
. . . from being mere tyranny. The information derived from these 
reports is not obtained for publication in any manner. It is entirely 
official. Under this state of fact, it does not seem to the court that 
these reports are in any sense records open to the use of the pub-
lic.51 
The Comingore court recognized that the facts before it differed in an 
important way from those of Hirsch and Weeks: Comingore involved, 
not a subpoena issued on behalf of a criminal defendant seeking to 
exercise his Sixth Amendment rights in his own defense, but a sub-
poena issued by the Commonwealth of Kentucky seeking to prosecute 
local liquor law violations.52 And the court did note deferentially that 
the regulations had been duly and lawfully propounded by the Inter-
nal Revenue Commissioner.53 But the cynosure of the court’s decision 
is reflected in the language excerpted above: the records were some-
how privileged for any purpose but that of providing compliance with 
federal tax laws. 
 It was the Comingore case—the case not involving an assertion by 
a criminal defendant of his right to compulsory process under the 
Sixth Amendment or a state congener—that found its way to the 
United States Supreme Court.54 Justice Harlan, writing for a unani-
mous Court, saw the lawsuit as posing two questions: whether the 
federal statute authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to promul-
gate regulations such as those at bar was constitutional; and, if so, 
whether the regulations themselves were within the scope of the leg-
islative delegation of power.55 Neither question invited extended dis-
course. That such a statute, designed to aid the Department of the 
Treasury in its most important functions, fell well within Congress’s 
“necessary and proper” power was established jurisprudence before 
Boske.56  
 The regulations in question provided that:  
[A]ll records in the offices of collectors of internal revenue, or any 
of their deputies, are in their custody and control “for purposes re-
lating to the collection of the revenues of the United States only,” 
                                                                                                                    
 51. Id. at 556-57. 
 52. Id. at 553. 
 53. Id. at 556-57. 
 54. See Boske v. Comingore, 177 U.S. 459 (1900). 
 55. See id. 
 56. Id. at 468 (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), and 
Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263 (1892)). 
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and that collectors “have no control of them, and no discretion with 
regard to permitting the use of them for any other purpose.”57 
The Court found that such regulations were within the contempla-
tion of the enabling statute.58 If the demised Internal Revenue re-
ports could routinely be subpoenaed in state civil litigation, taxpay-
ers obliged to file the reports would be caught between the Scylla of 
submitting false or incomplete forms (thus inviting federal criminal 
prosecution) and the Charybdis of exposing their private financial af-
fairs to the world at large (perhaps inviting civil litigation or per-
sonal embarrassment). It is in the interest of Congress, and of the 
Department of the Treasury, to provide taxpayers with every incen-
tive and no disincentive to file accurate returns. 
 Apart from that, however, the Court was concerned with preserv-
ing the power of the Secretary of the Treasury to control and admin-
ister his department. “[G]reat confusion might arise in the business 
of the Department if the Secretary allowed the use of records and pa-
pers in the custody of collectors to depend upon the discretion or 
judgment of subordinates.”59 The issue was not an alleged property 
interest or privilege that the Federal Government had in its tax re-
turns, but the power of a large federal department to keep its house 
in order by centralizing control over the administration of requests 
for those returns.60 Thus, the Court’s holding was as narrow as possi-
ble: the Secretary of the Treasury could lawfully “take from a subor-
dinate, such as a collector, all discretion as to permitting the records 
in his custody to be used for any other purpose than the collection of 
the revenue, and reserve for his own determination all matters of 
that character.”61 
 The power recognized in Boske made eminent good sense. In the 
late 19th century, at a time when photostatic copying was yet un-
imagined and unimaginable, compliance with a subpoena duces te-
cum was necessarily onerous, difficult, and a serious impediment to 
the day-to-day work of the subpoenaed party. A federal officer or em-
ployee might be obliged to travel for days by horseback, barge, or 
stagecoach to a distant courthouse, clutching the original of a docu-
ment which, if dropped or damaged, was all but irreplaceable; and 
knowing all the while that his colleagues back home were helpless to 
proceed with their business until he returned with that document in-
tact. Small wonder, then, that 19th-century legislators vested the 
heads of federal departments with the power affirmed by 19th-
century jurists in Boske and elsewhere. 
                                                                                                                    
 57. Id. at 469. 
 58. Id. at 470. 
 59. Id.  
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
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 Consider what Boske does not say. The opinion says nothing about 
the Sixth Amendment in particular or the compulsory process power 
in general. It could not, because no accused person was seeking to in-
voke that power. It says next to nothing, other than by implication, 
about the sovereign immunity of the United States, its agencies, or 
its agents; nor about the supremacy of its laws over those of the 
states. It says nothing about the law of immunities, or about the law 
of privilege. Boske simply acknowledges the power of the head of an 
executive department to designate the departmental records custo-
dian, i.e. to make (because authorized by statute to do so) a legally 
binding determination that the constructive custodian of records is 
someone other than the actual physical custodian.62 What that custo-
dian is to do in response to a subpoena duces tecum issuing from a 
state court (or, for that matter, a federal court) on behalf of a crimi-
nal defendant (or, for that matter, the state itself, or a private civil 
litigant) is a question neither squarely posed by the Boske facts nor 
squarely answered by the Boske holding. 
 In other words, there was no reason to believe that the constitu-
tional compulsory process power—recognized at the outset of the 
19th century as formidable enough to command congressmen, gover-
nors, even the President—was any less plenipotent at the outset of 
the 20th century. If the strength had gone out of the Sixth Amend-
ment, Boske was not to blame. 
III.   TOUHY V. RAGEN 
 Roger Touhy had been convicted in state court and was serving 
time in the state penitentiary.63 He initiated a habeas corpus pro-
ceeding in U.S. district court, in the course of which a subpoena 
duces tecum was served upon the agent in charge of the Chicago of-
fice of the FBI. The agent appeared in court, but when directed by 
the district judge to produce the documents called for in the sub-
poena, declined to do so, in reliance on “Department Rule No. 3229.”64 
 At all times material, 5 U.S.C. § 22, the so-called “housekeeping” 
statute, provided that, “The head of each department is authorized to 
prescribe regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the government 
of his department, the conduct of its officers and clerks, the distribu-
tion and performance of its business, and the custody, use, and pres-
ervation of the records, papers, and property appertaining to it.”65 
Acting upon that statute, the Attorney General, as head of the De-
                                                                                                                    
 62. Id. at 469-70. 
 63. United States ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen, 340 U.S. 462, 463 (1951). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 463 n.2 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 22 (1950) (current version at 5 U.S.C. § 301 
(2000)). 
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partment of Justice, had propounded Department Order 3229. That 
order provided, inter alia, that: 
Whenever a subpoena duces tecum is served to produce any of [the 
department’s] files, documents, records or information, the officer 
or employee on whom such subpoena is served, unless otherwise 
expressly directed by the Attorney General, will appear in court in 
answer thereto and respectfully decline to produce the records 
specified there in, on the ground that the disclosure of such records 
is prohibited by this regulation.66 
A supplement to the regulation, describing more particularly the pro-
cedures that Department employees should follow, provided: 
It is not necessary to bring the required documents into the court 
room . . . . If questioned [by the court about non-compliance], the 
officer or employee should state that the material is at hand and 
can be submitted to the court for determination as to its material-
ity to the case and whether in the best public interests the infor-
mation should be disclosed.67 
 The district court found Department Order 3229 not to excuse 
compliance with the subpoena and held the FBI agent in contempt.68 
The court of appeals reversed, finding that the “housekeeping” stat-
ute and Department Order 3229, taken together, rendered the sub-
poenaed documents privileged.69 
 The Supreme Court, however, found the case to be entirely con-
trolled by Boske.70 It saw “no material distinction between that case 
and this”71 and particularly noted that the regulation at issue in 
Boske was “of the same general character as Order No. 3229.”72 That 
being the case, the Court expressly declined any invitation to con-
sider whether the Attorney General could, pursuant to the “house-
keeping” statute or otherwise, “make a conclusive determination not 
to produce records”73 in this case. Such a question was not before the 
Court. As it had half a century earlier in Boske, the Court construed 
the question before it narrowly. Department Order 3229 was a valid 
exercise of the power properly delegated to the attorney general by 
the “housekeeping” statute.74 The effect of the order was to centralize 
control of, and decision-making power as to, departmental docu-
                                                                                                                    
 66. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Department Order No. 3229, 11 Fed. Reg. 4920 
(May 2, 1946)).  
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 465. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 469 (“This case is ruled by Boske . . . .”), 471 (“‘This case,’ the Court holds, ‘is 
ruled’ by Boske . . . . I agree.”) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 71. Id. at 470. 
 72. Id. at 469. 
 73. Id. at 467. 
 74. Id. at 468. 
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ments.75 The Attorney General, as department head, could conclu-
sively determine who the constructive custodian of records was as to 
any document within the Department of Justice; and he could do so 
without regard to the physical whereabouts of the document.76 De-
partment Order 3229, as read by the Court in Touhy, meant that the 
FBI agent in Chicago was not subject to punishment for non-
compliance with the subpoena for the simple reason that the sub-
poena should have been directed to someone else.77 
 The Court went no further. No more than it had in Boske did it 
consider the Sixth Amendment in particular or the compulsory proc-
ess power in general. It could not, because no accused person was 
seeking to invoke that power.78 Boske left untouched the issues of the 
sovereign immunity of the United States, its agencies, and its agents, 
and the supremacy of its laws over those of the states. Touhy had no 
occasion to reach those issues because there was no state court pro-
ceeding and no state court subpoena. The subpoena in question ema-
nated from a U.S. district court. Although the court of appeals had 
resolved Touhy by reference to the doctrine of privilege, the Supreme 
Court expressly declined to consider the jurisprudence of privilege or 
immunity.79 
 Like Boske, Touhy recognized the authority of the head of an ex-
ecutive department to make a legally binding determination that the 
records custodian, as to any document within the control of that de-
partment, is someone other than the person in actual physical pos-
session of the document.80 Had Roger Touhy offered to prove that the 
                                                                                                                    
 75. Id. at 470. 
 76. Id. at 469-70. 
 77. Id. at 468. 
 78. Touhy had been convicted in a state criminal trial. In his habeas petition, he 
was—nominally at least—a plaintiff in a civil action. The Touhy Court recognized that 
matters might be different if the case “concerned . . . the effect of a refusal to produce in a 
prosecution by the United States,” i.e. in a case in which the Sixth Amendment compulsory 
process right was directly implicated. Id. at 467 (emphasis added) (citing United States v. 
Andolschek, 142 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1944)). Andolschek involved I.R.S. regulations akin to 
those considered in Boske v. Comingore. The Second Circuit recognized the precedential ef-
fect of Boske, but held: 
While we must accept it as lawful for a department of the government to sup-
press documents, even when they will help determine controversies between 
third persons, we cannot agree that this should include their suppression in a 
criminal prosecution, founded upon those very dealings to which the documents 
relate, and whose criminality they will, or may, tend to exculpate. So far as they 
directly touch the criminal dealings, the prosecution necessarily ends any confi-
dential character the documents may possess; it must be conducted in the open, 
and will lay bare their subject matter. The government must choose; either it 
must leave the transactions in the obscurity from which a trial will draw them, or 
it must expose them fully. 
Andolschek, 142 F.2d at 506.  
 79. See Touhy, 340 U.S. at 468 (citing WIGMORE, supra note 11, §§ 2374, 2378). 
 80. See id. at 468-69. 
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documents he sought were in the hip pocket of the FBI agent to 
whom his subpoena was directed, his proof would have been immate-
rial. Congress is constitutionally empowered to authorize the heads 
of executive departments to maintain good order by centralizing con-
trol of, and decision-making power as to, documents within their de-
partments. Such good order will, presumably, contribute to efficient 
government, minimize costs and duplication of labor, and assure uni-
form policies and practices within each department. It will also serve 
to provide well-deserved protection to the subpoenaed FBI agent or 
any similarly-situated “subordinate official who otherwise would be 
caught in the unpleasant dilemma of refusing to obey either an order 
of his superior or one issued by a court.”81 Department Order 3229 
was within the scope of the delegation of power to the Attorney Gen-
eral. Its wording identified “the Attorney General, [t]he Assistant to 
the Attorney General, or an Assistant Attorney General acting for 
him”82 as the custodian of records for the Department of Justice. Ser-
vice of a subpoena duces tecum upon anyone else—in Touhy, service 
upon an FBI agent—was simply of no legal effect. 
 Deliberately left unconsidered in Touhy, as in Boske, was the legal 
effect of service upon the designated custodian of records, in this case 
the Attorney General. “[T]he case as we understand it raises no ques-
tion as to the power of the Attorney General himself to make such a 
refusal. The Attorney General was not before the trial court.”83 Jus-
tice Frankfurter premised his concurrence on this very point: 
I wholly agree with what is now decided insofar as it finds that 
whether, when and how the Attorney General himself can be 
granted an immunity from the duty to disclose information con-
tained in documents within his possession that are relevant to a 
judicial proceeding are matters not here for adjudication. There-
fore, not one of these questions is impliedly affected by the very 
narrow ruling on which the present decision rests. . . . In joining 
the Court’s opinion I assume . . . that the Attorney General can be 
reached by legal process.84 
 In the half-century since Touhy, the Supreme Court has had noth-
ing to add to the Boske/Touhy jurisprudence. If in the interim the 
mighty Sixth Amendment compulsory process power had lost its 
punch—if it could no longer bring even the most august executive of-
ficers under its sway—the Supreme Court was not to blame. 
                                                                                                                    
 81. Davis Enters. v. EPA, 877 F.2d 1181, 1189 (3d Cir. 1989) (Weis, J., dissenting). 
Judge Weis was adamant that Touhy go no further. Touhy “is sometimes cited for the 
proposition that an agency head is free to withhold evidence from a court. But the Supreme 
Court in Touhy specifically refused to reach that question.” Id. at 1189. 
 82. Touhy, 340 U.S. at 463 (quoting Department Order No. 3229, 11 Fed. Reg. 4920 
(May 2, 1946)). 
 83. Id. at 467. 
 84. Id. at 472 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
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IV.   CATCH 16.22 
 The “housekeeping” statute has been relocated to 5 U.S.C. § 301. 
Unchanged in substance since the days of Touhy, it now provides: 
The head of an Executive department or military department may 
prescribe regulations for the government of his department, the 
conduct of its employees, the distribution and performance of its 
business, and the custody, use, and preservation of its records, pa-
pers, and property. This section does not authorize withholding in-
formation from the public or limiting the availability of records to 
the public.85 
 Department Order 3229, however, has been replaced by a series of 
federal regulations extending from 28 C.F.R. § 16.22 through § 16.29. 
Captioned “General prohibition of production or disclosure in Federal 
and State proceedings in which the United States is not a party,” § 
16.22 forbids any present or former employee of the Department of 
Justice to comply with a subpoena in a case in which the United 
States is not a party unless prior approval has been obtained from 
the Department.86 The procedure for obtaining such prior approval 
obliges the party issuing the subpoena to append “an affidavit, or . . . 
a statement by the party . . . setting forth a summary of the testi-
mony sought and its relevance to the proceeding.”87 Sections 16.24 
and 16.25 set out in detail the internal procedures by which the De-
partment of Justice evaluates and passes upon a subpoena described 
in § 16.22.88 
 In litigation to which the United States is a party, § 16.23 gov-
erns.89 Like § 16.22, it provides that a subpoena ad testificandum to a 
present or former employee of the Department must be accompanied 
by an affidavit or statement setting forth a summary of the testi-
mony sought.90 Because the United States is a party to the litigation, 
the summary is to be submitted, not through Department of Justice 
channels, but directly “to the Department attorney handling the case 
or matter.”91 If, for example, Jill Defendant’s lawyer seeks to obtain 
the testimony of Agent Jones at the trial of United States v. Jill De-
fendant, he must submit a summary of the testimony he proposes to 
elicit from Jones to the very United States Attorney’s Office that is 
prosecuting Jill. Unlike § 16.22, § 16.23 does not require that the 
summary of the testimony also include a proffer as to its relevance. 
                                                                                                                    
 85. 5 U.S.C. § 301 (2000). 
 86. 28 C.F.R. § 16.22 (2001). 
 87. 28 C.F.R. § 16.22(c). The rule is the same for subpoenas duces tecum. 28 C.F.R. § 
16.22(d). 
 88. 28 C.F.R. §§ 16.24-16.25 (2001). 
 89. 28 C.F.R. § 16.23 (2001). 
 90. 28 C.F.R. § 16.23(c). 
 91. Id. 
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Because the lawsuit is one to which the United States is a party, the 
Department assumes that the assistant U.S. attorney handling the 
prosecution is already equipped to evaluate the relevance of the tes-
timony in the defense case. 
 Once the Department determines that an employee or former em-
ployee upon whom a subpoena has been served should not provide 
testimony or material in compliance with the subpoena, the proce-
dure is the same whether or not the United States is a party to the 
litigation. Section 16.28 provides that “the employee or former em-
ployee upon whom the demand has been made shall . . . respectfully 
decline to comply.”92 Section 16.28 then concludes: “See United States 
ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen, 340 U.S. 462 (1951).”93 
 Whatever may be said in defense of 28 C.F.R. §§ 16.22-16.29, 
these regulations cannot be justified by reference to Boske and 
Touhy. The reach of the regulations extends far beyond the contem-
plation of those two Supreme Court cases. The Court took pains to 
cast Boske and Touhy as narrowly as possible, holding only that the 
delegation of power to an executive department head made by the 
“housekeeping” statute was sufficient to enable that department 
head to centralize control over records in his department for pur-
poses of compliance with subpoenas duces tecum. The regulations 
seek to create an evidentiary privilege that cannot be derived from 
Boske or Touhy. The regulations extend to subpoenas ad testifican-
dum as fully as to subpoenas duces tecum, which cannot be derived 
from Boske or Touhy. The regulations oblige a criminal defendant, as 
a condition precedent to the exercise of his Sixth Amendment rights, 
to retail to adverse counsel his (or his attorney’s) mental work prod-
uct in the form of an “affidavit or statement” appended to the sub-
poena.94 This limitation on the exercise of a constitutional right can-
not by any hermeneutics be derived from Boske and Touhy. In these 
and other particulars, the regulations range far beyond territory 
mapped by Boske and Touhy. Properly construed, Boske and Touhy, 
and regulations looking to those cases for support, do no more than 
“give Justice Department [or other federal agency] employees the au-
thority, when so ordered by superiors, to refuse to comply with a 
subpoena ordering disclosure of confidential files when the United 
                                                                                                                    
 92. 28 C.F.R. § 16.28 (2001). If the Department has not completed its evaluation of 
the subpoena and accompanying proffer, § 16.27 provides that a Department attorney 
“shall appear and furnish the court . . . with a copy of the regulations contained in this 
subpart and inform the court” that compliance with the subpoena is under consideration. 
28 C.F.R. § 16.27 (2001). The Department attorney should then “request the court . . . to 
stay the demand [i.e. the subpoena] pending” its consideration by departmental higher-
ups. Id. In effect, the Department attorney is to ask the district judge to put a trial on hold 
in medias res while the departmental chain of command determines if an accused citizen is 
to be afforded the benefit of his Sixth Amendment rights. 
 93. 28 C.F.R. § 16.28. 
 94. 28 C.F.R. § 16.22(c) (2001). 
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States is not a party to a legal action.”95 A decade and a half after 
Touhy, the same federal appellate court that gave the world Touhy 
affirmed contempt citations imposed by the trial court upon the spe-
cial agent in charge of the Chicago FBI office (i.e. the holder of the 
same office as the person to whom the subpoena in Touhy was di-
rected) for his refusal to answer questions (but not for his refusal to 
produce documents) in a case in which he had been subpoenaed by 
the alleged boss of the Chicago mafia.96 “We cannot justify the asser-
tion of a general and unlimited authority of a departmental head to 
instruct a subordinate not to give any testimony in a certain case 
pending in a district court.”97 
 To say that the regulations cannot be justified in terms of Boske 
and Touhy alone is not to say that the regulations cannot be justified. 
As the cases considered infra make clear, the variety of demands 
made by subpoena upon the Federal Government nowadays, and the 
variety of contexts in which those demands are made, has necessarily 
moved the jurisprudence in this area far beyond what could have 
been imagined at the time and on the facts of the revenue cases. De-
pending on the demand, and on the context, application of the regu-
lations may raise issues under the Sixth Amendment, the Supremacy 
Clause, the doctrine of sovereign immunity, and so on. For purposes 
of analysis, it is simplest to begin with those cases in which the Sixth 
Amendment is of no, or only limited, concern; then to proceed to fed-
eral criminal cases; and finally to consider state criminal cases. 
                                                                                                                    
 95. Louisiana v. Sparks, 978 F.2d 226, 234 (5th Cir. 1992). In other words, “Touhy 
held that the Attorney General could validly withdraw from his subordinates the power to 
release department papers and that the subordinate could properly refuse to produce those 
papers pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum.” Smith v. C.R.C. Builders Co., 626 F. Supp. 
12, 14 (D. Colo. 1983). Nor does the “housekeeping” statute itself contemplate a power as 
capacious as that which the Department of Justice purports to exercise:  
[The “housekeeping” statute] was intended only to allow agencies to regulate 
their internal procedures for receiving and processing demands . . . for access to 
information in their files. It was not intended to confer on an agency or any of its 
officials the substantive authority either to withhold information as a matter of 
absolute discretion or to promulgate and assert any form of executive privilege 
against disclosure. While the regulations . . . may therefore validly prescribe en-
forceable procedures for presenting and internally processing such demands, they 
may not go further and lay down substantive grounds for their denial, either as a 
matter of unreviewable discretion or as a matter of qualified privilege. To the ex-
tent they purport to do the latter, they are invalid.  
Smith v. Cromer, 159 F.3d 875, 889 (4th Cir. 1998) (Phillips, Sr. J., dissenting). 
 96. Giancana v. Johnson, 335 F.2d 372 (7th Cir. 1964). 
 97. Id. at 376. See also Golden Pac. Bancorp v. FDIC, No. 99-3799, 1999 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 20303, at *6-7 (D.N.J. Nov. 9, 1999) (“Touhy regulations do not create a privilege 
against judicial discovery. Rather, in order to support a Touhy-based claim of insulation 
from subpoena, the agency information must be protected by an independent discovery 
privilege.”); Landry v. FBI, No. 97-197, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9850, at *9 (E.D. La. July 3, 
1997) (“[N]either 5 U.S.C. § 301[, the ‘housekeeping’ statute,] nor the Department of Jus-
tice’s Touhy regulations create a privilege or authorize the withholding of information from 
the public.”). 
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V.   THE CASES APPLYING THE REGULATIONS 
A.   Cases in Which No Sixth Amendment Issue Arises 
1.   Civil Cases Originating in State Court 
 Swett v. Schenk98 began life as a civil case in the Superior Court of 
California. Plaintiff’s parents had died in a plane crash.99 He brought 
suit for wrongful death against various defendants including the pi-
lot’s estate and the manufacturer of the aircraft.100 
 The National Transportation Safety Board (“NTSB”), a federal 
agency, conducted an investigation into the cause of the crash.101 In 
the course of preparing his civil lawsuit, Swett sought the deposition 
testimony of an NTSB investigator. Although the investigator ap-
peared for deposition and responded to some questions, he refused to 
answer others.102 His refusal was in reliance upon orders from the 
NTSB chairman, which orders in turn were premised on an agency 
regulation akin to those appearing at 28 C.F.R. §§ 16.22-16.29.103 
Swett sought relief before the state trial court, which ordered the 
witness to answer.104 The matter was then removed to federal court 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442.105 
 The district court properly held that, in the exercise of its state 
court derivative jurisdiction, it was without power to compel the fed-
eral inspector’s answers. In affirming, the Ninth Circuit cited Touhy 
for the proposition “that subordinate federal officers could not be held 
in contempt for failing to comply with a court order in reliance on a 
validly promulgated regulation to the contrary.”106 Because the regu-
lation at issue here was validly promulgated, the reliance was pro-
tected. 
                                                                                                                    
 98. 792 F.2d 1447 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 99. Id. at 1449. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id.  
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. The regulation in question differed from §§ 16.22-16.29 in one important re-
spect, discussed infra: It expressly permitted testimony as to matters of fact, prohibiting 
testimony only as to matters of opinion. 
 104. Swett, 792 F.2d at 1449.  
 105. 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a) provides that: 
A civil action or criminal prosecution commenced in a State court against any of 
the following may be removed by them to the district court of the United States 
for the district and division embracing the place wherein it is pending: 
 (1)[A]ny officer (or any person acting under that officer) of the United States 
or of any agency thereof, . . . for any act under color of such office . . . . 
Removal in such cases does not extend to the entire underlying cause of action. All that is 
before the federal district court is the plaintiff’s application for an order directing the fed-
eral witness to answer the demised questions. In addressing this issue, the federal court, 
in effect, sits as a state court, i.e., its jurisdiction is not that of a United States district 
court but that of the state court from which the matter was removed. See, e.g., Arizona v. 
Manypenny, 451 U.S. 232 (1981); Minnesota v. United States, 305 U.S. 382 (1939). 
 106. Swett, 792 F.2d at 1451.  
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 The Ninth Circuit opinion provides no discussion of the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity as such. In his dissent, however, Judge Norris 
cast the issue in terms of that doctrine.107 Because the regulation in 
question permitted the giving of fact testimony but not opinion tes-
timony, it constituted, in Judge Norris’s view, a waiver of the inspec-
tor’s “immunity from testimonial compulsion with respect to matters 
of fact.”108 That being the case, Judge Norris “disagree[d] that sover-
eign immunity deprived the state court of jurisdiction to compel fact 
testimony.”109 
 Sovereign immunity is an attribute that inheres in the govern-
ment of the United States. When a state court seeks to compel an 
agent of the government of the United States in his capacity as 
agent, that attribute is implicated. In Swett, the California court 
sought to order an NTSB inspector to testify to information acquired 
in his official capacity.110 Were there no “housekeeping” statute, no 
regulation, and no Touhy, the United States would still have the 
power to protect its agent from the visitorial power of the state court. 
Of course the United States may, in a given context, decline to exer-
cise that protection. Perhaps Judge Norris had the better of the ar-
gument when he noted that the regulation in question is, in one re-
spect, permissive: It provides that an NTSB inspector may give tes-
timony as to matters of fact, and in so providing may constitute a 
partial waiver of sovereign immunity.111 But whether this is so or not, 
Swett is no case in which to test the propriety of departmental regu-
lations, nor to reconcile such regulations with the Sixth Amendment. 
Swett simply stands for the unremarkable proposition that in civil 
cases, state courts cannot command federal officers unless federal 
law says they can.112 This is sovereign immunity at its most basic, 
and—as noted supra—the analysis would be the same if Touhy had 
never been written. Apart from being unnecessary to a resolution of 
the sole issue raised in Swett (i.e. immunity of the federal sovereign 
and its officers to state compulsion), consideration of Touhy only con-
fuses matters. As noted supra, Swett cites Touhy as exempting “sub-
ordinate federal officers” from any obligation “to comply with a court 
order.”113 This reads Touhy far too broadly. Touhy exempts subordi-
nate federal officers from contempt citations for failure to comply 
                                                                                                                    
 107. Id. at 1452-53 (Norris, J., dissenting). 
 108. Id. at 1452 (Norris, J., dissenting). 
 109. Id. Some confusion may be engendered by describing the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity as “jurisdictional.” Sovereign immunity can be waived by the sovereign. Matters 
that are truly jurisdictional can never be waived; parties cannot, by waiver, vest a court 
with jurisdiction where otherwise it would have none. 
 110. Id. at 1449. 
 111. 49 C.F.R. § 835.3(b) (2001). 
 112. See Swett, 792 F.2d at 1452. 
 113. Id. at 1451. 
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with a very specific kind of court order—a subpoena duces tecum—in 
a very specific context: when the department head has arrogated to 
himself or his designee the custody of the sought-after evidence.114 
 All but identical to Swett is Boron Oil Co. v. Downie.115 Downie 
was an employee of the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) 
who served as “On-Scene Coordinator” of an investigation into an al-
leged gasoline leak at a Boron Oil Company service station.116 When 
a tort suit was brought against Boron in state court, both sides at-
tempted to subpoena Downie as a trial witness.117 In reliance upon 
agency regulations118 and instructions from his superiors, Downie de-
clined to testify.119 The EPA sought to quash the trial subpoenas in 
state court; when that application was unsuccessful, the EPA re-
moved the subpoena proceedings to U.S. district court.120 Although 
the district court declined to quash the subpoenas, the court of ap-
peals reversed.121 
 The Fourth Circuit apparently considered the EPA entitled to 
quashal on either of two bases: failure of the private litigants to com-
ply with the procedures set forth in valid agency regulations, and 
sovereign immunity. The district court had rejected the sovereign 
immunity argument on the ground that sovereign immunity was in-
applicable to a case in which the United States was not a party.122 
The court of appeals reversed, citing Dugan v. Rank123 and Ports-
mouth Redevelopment & Housing Authority v. Pierce124 for the 
proposition that sovereign immunity is implicated where, as here, a 
state court subpoena is issued to a federal agent in that agent’s 
official capacity.125 Because the federal sovereign had not waived its 
immunity, the subpoena must be quashed. The analysis could and 
should have ended there. 
 Prior to its sovereign immunity analysis, however, the Boron 
court had discussed, as an independent basis for quashal, the failure 
of the plaintiffs to comply with the EPA regulation regarding testi-
mony of agency employees.126 As did the court in Swett,127 the court in 
                                                                                                                    
 114. See United States ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen, 340 U.S. 462 (1951). 
 115. 873 F.2d 67 (4th Cir. 1989). 
 116. Id. at 68. 
 117. Id. Although both sides subpoenaed Downie, it was the plaintiffs who brought the 
motion to compel. 
 118. 40 C.F.R. § 2.401 (1986). 
 119. Boron Oil Co., 873 F.2d at 68. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 72. 
 122. Id. at 68-69. Although the district court was mistaken, there is a difference for 
these purposes between cases in which the United States is a party and cases in which it is 
not. See discussion infra Part V.A.2. 
 123. 372 U.S. 609 (1963). 
 124. 706 F.2d 471 (4th Cir. 1983). 
 125. Boron Oil Co., 873 F.2d at 71. 
 126. Id. at 69. 
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Boron began its analysis by over-reading Touhy: “The Supreme Court 
has specifically recognized the authority of agency heads to restrict 
testimony of their subordinates by this type of regulation.”128 The Su-
preme Court has done nothing of the kind—not in Touhy and not 
elsewhere. Discussion of Touhy adds nothing to the resolution of Bo-
ron. The observation made in connection with Swett is equally appli-
cable here: Were there no “housekeeping” statute, no regulation, no 
Touhy, the result would have been the same. “The EPA issued a writ-
ten determination that Downie not be permitted to testify.”129 Sover-
eign immunity having been thus asserted and nowhere waived, noth-
ing more was needed to resolve the matter.130 
2.   Civil Cases Originating in Federal Court 
 a.   Cases in Which the United States is Not a Party.—When a 
state, acting through its court, attempts to exercise its visitorial 
powers upon an agent or agency of the United States, the issue of 
sovereign immunity appears in bold relief. When the United States 
government, acting through its court, attempts to exercise its 
visitorial powers upon its own agent or agency, the issue of sovereign 
immunity is more difficult to discern. There is an isonomy between 
the judicial branch that issues the subpoena and the executive 
branch that receives it. The power that vivifies one is the power that 
vivifies the other. It is gibberish to say that the federal sovereign is 
“immune” from itself. 
 If that is so,131 the proper disposition of subpoenas issued in fed-
eral cases to federal officers cannot be determined by use of the sim-
ple sovereign immunity model employed in the state court cases dis-
cussed supra. Consideration of Touhy and regulations alleged to have 
been propounded upon its authority was irrelevant to the state court 
cases; but such consideration has been found to be relevant and nec-
essary in recent federal cases.132 After receiving partial approbation 
                                                                                                                    
 127. Swett v. Schenk, 792 F.2d 1447, 1451 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 128. Boron Oil Co., 873 F.2d at 69 (citing Touhy). 
 129. Id. at 68. 
 130. See Davis Enters. v. EPA, 877 F.2d 1181, 1186 (3d Cir. 1989) (“In Boron . . . the 
EPA relied on a sovereign immunity theory . . . .”). 
 131. At least one prominent court takes a conceptually different view. For the Second 
Circuit, sovereign immunity is as much a sticking point in federal court as it is in state 
court: The subpoena that issues out of the federal court is not the court’s subpoena, but the 
litigant’s subpoena. The litigant, a private party, seeks by that subpoena to command an 
agent or agency of the sovereign. Thus, the sovereign immunity problem remains. A fed-
eral “subpoena duces tecum issued by General Electric to the EPA would compel the EPA 
to act and therefore is barred by sovereign immunity in the absence of a waiver.” EPA v. 
Gen. Elec. Co., 197 F.3d 592, 597 (2d Cir. 1999). The court, however, found the requisite 
waiver in the Administrative Procedure Act. Id. at 598. See also Houston Bus. Journal, Inc. 
v. Office of Comptroller of Currency, 86 F.3d 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1996).  
 132. See, e.g., In re Boeh, 25 F.3d 761 (9th Cir. 1994). 
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from the Ninth Circuit in 1994, Touhy-spawned regulations came in 
for condign criticism, both in the Ninth Circuit and elsewhere.133 
 In re Recalcitrant Witness Richard Boeh134 began as a federal civil 
rights suit. The plaintiffs in the underlying action sought damages 
against the Los Angeles Police Department in connection with the 
shooting deaths of three individuals and the critical wounding of an-
other.135 Boeh was the FBI agent who headed the Bureau’s investiga-
tion of the shootings.136 Plaintiffs subpoenaed Boeh as a trial witness 
in the civil rights suit. “Plaintiffs’ purpose in serving the subpoena 
was to secure Boeh’s testimony regarding evidence he had collected 
in his investigation and his conclusions as to what had actually oc-
curred at the scene.”137 The subpoena was referred up the Depart-
ment of Justice ladder; the Department, citing 28 C.F.R. § 16.22(a), 
directed Boeh to decline to testify.138 
 Although the district court cited Boeh for contempt, the Ninth 
Circuit reversed the order.139 “Boeh may not be held in contempt for 
failing to comply with a court order if a valid regulation required him 
not to comply.”140 As to the propriety of the demised regulations, 
“[a]ny doubt as to the validity of the regulation’s requirement of prior 
approval is foreclosed, in our view, by the Supreme Court’s decision 
in [Touhy], which upheld the validity of a predecessor to 28 C.F.R. § 
16.22(a).”141 
 As he had in Swett,142 Judge Norris dissented in Boeh.143 The focus 
of his dissent was the majority’s over-reading of Touhy.144 Touhy, in 
Judge Norris’s view, “does not control this case.”145 The inapplicabil-
ity of Touhy arises from “the difference between a subpoena duces te-
cum and a subpoena ad testificandum—the difference . . . between 
documentary evidence and live testimony.”146 Touhy and the “house-
keeping” statute deal with the former but not the latter. 
 The ability to produce documents in response to a subpoena 
duces tecum is impersonal. . . . Which agency employees may pro-
duce documents is a matter suitable for treatment in agency regu-
                                                                                                                    
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 763. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. (citing Ex parte Sackett, 74 F.2d 922, 923 (9th Cir. 1935) and Boron Oil Co. v. 
Downie, 873 F.2d 67, 69 (4th Cir. 1989)). 
 141. Id. at 763-64 (citation omitted). See also Herr v. McCormick Grain, No. 92-1321-
PFK, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9088, at *3 (D. Kan. June 28, 1994). 
 142. Swett v. Schenk, 792 F.2d 1447, 1452 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 143. See Boeh, 25 F.3d at 767 (Norris, J., dissenting). 
 144. Id. (Norris, J., dissenting). 
 145. Id. at 768 (Norris, J., dissenting). 
 146. Id. at 769 (Norris, J., dissenting). 
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lations promulgated pursuant to the “housekeeping” statute. Be-
cause the head of an agency cannot divest herself of the authority 
to control internal documents, she always has the ability to herself 
comply with a subpoena duces tecum served upon her. Her per-
sonal knowledge of the contents of the documents is irrelevant; all 
that matters is that they are within her control. 
 In contrast, the ability to produce testimony is personal. Because 
the testimony must be based upon the witness’ personal knowl-
edge, it can only be produced by the witness himself. Only Agent 
Boeh can comply with the subpoena ad testificandum at issue 
here. Moreover, nobody other than Agent Boeh himself may be 
subpoenaed to produce Agent Boeh’s testimony. Not even the At-
torney General herself can be subpoenaed for that purpose.147 
Judge Norris contended that neither the “housekeeping” statute nor 
Touhy go any further than to empower an agency head “to regulate 
employees, manage agency business, and control agency papers and 
property.”148 Agency regulations purporting to assert an evidentiary 
privilege can draw no support from the “housekeeping” statute or 
Touhy: 
The statute cannot be read as authorizing agency heads to adopt 
regulations creating an executive privilege not to testify. It cannot 
be read as supporting the government’s argument that an agency 
head can, by not authorizing a subordinate to testify, strip the dis-
trict court of Article III power to enforce its subpoena.149 
 As a solatium for the loss of effective subpoena power, the major-
ity suggested that the plaintiffs might have a remedy under the pro-
visions of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06, or 
perhaps by way of mandamus against the Attorney General pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1361.150 Judge Norris was as critical of these sugges-
tions as he was of the majority position in general: 
Neither route is an acceptable substitute to the time-honored 
means of obtaining a witness’s testimony by serving him with a 
subpoena ad testificandum, backed up by the court’s power of con-
tempt. If [Plaintiff] Gomez had a right to Boeh’s testimony, he had 
a right to obtain it when he needed it, which in this case was im-
mediately, while the trial was still going on. Forcing Gomez to file 
a separate mandamus action or a cumbersome APA suit in the 
middle of his civil rights trial is so burdensome that it effectively 
eviscerates his right to obtain Boeh’s testimony.151 
                                                                                                                    
 147. Id. (Norris, J., dissenting). 
 148. Id. at 771. (Norris, J., dissenting). 
 149. Id. (Norris, J., dissenting). 
 150. Id. at 764 n.3. 
 151. Id. at 770 n.4 (Norris, J., dissenting). 
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 A scant three months later, a different panel of the Ninth Circuit 
had occasion to reconsider the issues over which Judge Norris had 
clashed so sharply with the majority in Boeh. The panel that decided 
Exxon Shipping Co. v. United States Department of Interior,152 how-
ever, went beyond the position taken by Judge Norris in his Boeh 
dissent. 
 Various individuals, businesses, and local governments sued 
Exxon Corporation and Exxon Shipping Corporation for injuries al-
leged to have resulted from the Exxon Valdez oil spill.153 In the 
course of the litigation, Exxon issued a notice of deposition and sub-
poena to ten federal employees, claiming that these individuals, in 
their capacity as federal officials, possessed information vital to the 
lawsuit.154 The agencies involved instructed eight of the ten employ-
ees not to appear for deposition. The other two employees were per-
mitted to appear and to provide some testimony, but not to answer 
questions as to certain matters. Exxon sought to enforce compliance 
with its subpoenas, arguing that the agencies’ actions were not au-
thorized by the “housekeeping” statute and the various regulations 
propounded on the supposed authority of that statute.155 
 Anticipating the Touhy issue, Exxon brought its enforcement ac-
tion, not against the recalcitrant witnesses, but against the depart-
ments or agencies by which those witnesses were employed.156 This 
enabled Exxon to argue, and the Ninth Circuit to conclude, that 
Touhy was not controlling. “Here, unlike in Touhy, the agencies 
themselves are named defendants. Thus, the ultimate question of 
federal agencies’ authority to withhold discovery . . . is squarely at is-
sue.”157 That “ultimate question,” of course, had been reserved in 
Touhy, where the sole issue was the authority of an agency head, not 
to withhold evidence, but to designate a records custodian for pur-
poses of compelled production of evidence.158 Having identified the is-
sue before it, the Ninth Circuit went further even than Judge Norris 
had been prepared to go in Boeh: Without distinguishing between 
subpoenas ad testificandum and subpoenas duces tecum, it held that 
                                                                                                                    
 152. 34 F.3d 774 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 153. The two underlying actions were SeaHawk Seafoods, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., No. A89-
0095-CV (D. Alaska 1989) and Exxon Valdez Litig., 3AN-89-2533CI (Alaska Super. Ct. 
1989)—one federal case and one state case. 
 154. Exxon Shipping Co., 34 F.3d at 775-76. The federal agencies were the Department 
of Interior (and the United States Fish and Wildlife Service, an agency within the Depart-
ment of Interior), the Department of Health and Human Services, the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency, the Department of Agriculture, and the Department of Commerce. See id. 
at 775 n.1. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Wisely, Exxon brought the action to compel discovery in the federal case, thus 
avoiding the sovereign immunity issue that would have arisen had enforcement been 
sought in state court. 
 157. Id. at 777. 
 158. United States ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen, 340 U.S. 462, 467-68 (1951). 
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“neither the [‘housekeeping’] statute’s text, its legislative history, nor 
Supreme Court case law supports the government’s argument that [5 
U.S.C.] § 301 authorizes agency heads to withhold documents or tes-
timony from federal courts.”159  
 Exxon came before the court, not as a motion filed in the pending 
lawsuit on the merits, but as a free-standing civil cause of action to 
compel discovery.160 Had the subpoenas in the underlying litigation 
been duces tecum, Exxon’s failure to seek relief through such a free-
standing complaint would have been outcome-determinative. A mo-
tion to compel directed to the individuals subpoenaed would have 
been unenforceable by operation of Touhy; and no motion could have 
been directed to the executive departments or their department 
heads because neither was before the court. Because the subpoenas 
were ad testificandum, however, Exxon might have proceeded by 
moving to enforce the subpoenas against the individuals in the un-
derlying litigation. Of course, at the time the issue arose, Exxon 
could not have known that the Ninth Circuit would boldly—and 
properly—find that Touhy has nothing at all to say about subpoenas 
ad testificandum. 
 Nor did the Exxon court have any use for the suggestion made by 
its colleagues in Boeh that relief was available by means of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act. Citing Judge Norris’s dissent in Boeh, 
the Exxon court “acknowledge[d] that collateral APA proceedings can 
be costly, time-consuming, inconvenient to litigants, and may ‘effec-
tively eviscerate[]’ any right to the requested testimony.”161 
                                                                                                                    
 159. Exxon Shipping Co., 34 F.3d at 778 (emphasis added). 
 160. See id. at 775. 
 161. Id. at 780 n.11 (quoting In re Boeh, 25 F.3d 761, 770 n.4 (9th Cir. 1994) (Norris, J., 
dissenting)). The Second Circuit in EPA v. General Electric Co., 197 F.3d 592 (2d Cir. 
1999), found that the APA was the only available remedy for a litigant in this situation. 
The court held, however, that the APA did not require the filing of a new complaint, inde-
pendent of the ongoing litigation on the merits, to compel enforcement of the subpoena. 
Rather, the district judge before whom the litigation was proceeding could simply apply the 
APA standards and determine the enforceability of the subpoena. 
[T]he EPA’s refusal to comply with the subpoena duces tecum issued by General 
Electric may be reviewed in the civil proceeding [below] by [a] motion to enforce. 
In allowing the district court to proceed under the provisions of the APA to de-
termine the propriety of the subpoena, without a separate and independent law-
suit, we recognize the scheme for waiver of sovereign immunity for review of 
agency actions provided by the APA, permit the use of subpoenas for discovery to 
be served upon the United States . . . in accordance with the pertinent rules of 
procedure, and promote judicial economy by allowing the underlying litigation to 
advance without delay. 
 On remand, the district court will, of course, review the EPA’s refusal to re-
spond to the subpoena under the standards for review established by the APA. . . 
. Applying these standards, the district court will decide whether the EPA’s ac-
tion in withholding documents is, among other things, “arbitrary, capricious, an 
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 
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 Exxon has afforded the federal courts an opportunity to restore 
their intended and proper meanings to the “housekeeping” statute 
and Touhy. Courts other than the Ninth Circuit have now “likewise 
conclude[d] that Congress did not empower [federal agencies] to pre-
scribe regulations that direct a party to deliberately disobey a court 
order, subpoena, or other judicial mechanism requiring the produc-
tion of information.”162 If compliance with a particular subpoena in a 
particular case would be oppressive or burdensome, there are federal 
rules of procedure and of evidence that provide courts with means of 
remedying such abuses, and those means may be invoked by the gov-
ernment as well as by private litigants.163 The mere prospect of com-
pliance with process, burdensome or otherwise, is no justification for 
ignoring rules of procedure and of evidence simply because it is the 
government that is obliged to comply. “The Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure do not bow to executive pontification, and absent some 
specific grant of authority from Congress, executive agencies . . . may 
not impose restrictions upon the power of this court to call witnesses 
before it and compel them to testify.”164 Of course, a federal agent or 
employee who appears in response to a subpoena and testifies is 
free—as is any other witness—to assert such privileges as may apply 
to his testimony. But the assertion of privilege by a testifying witness 
in response to a particular question is very different from the general 
assertion by government of the immunity of its agents and employees 
from compulsory process. 
 b.   Cases in Which the United States is a Party.—As a function of 
sovereign immunity, the United States need never be a litigant. If 
the sovereign is a litigant, it is because the sovereign has chosen to 
be a litigant. If the sovereign chooses to be a litigant, the sovereign 
cannot be heard to assert its immunity. In cases to which the United 
States is a party, the United States must play by the rules—
procedural and evidentiary—regarding the conduct of parties. Those 
                                                                                                                    
706(2)(A). In this regard the district court may consider EPA claims of privilege 
and undue burden. 
Id. at 599 (citations omitted).  
 162. In re Bankers Trust Co., 61 F.3d 465, 470 (6th Cir. 1995). 
 163. See, e.g., United States v. Pereda-Aleman, No. 94-2197, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 
15162 (10th Cir. June 20, 1995). In Pereda-Aleman, a criminal case, the defendant sought 
to subpoena a DEA agent “who had testified in a previous, unrelated case and who would 
have testified in this case that ‘it is not at all unusual for the driver of a vehicle containing 
contraband to have no knowledge of such contraband.’” Id. at *3. The district court, on ap-
plication from the prosecution, excluded the proferred “expert” testimony as irrelevant. 
Citing Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and 704, the court of appeals affirmed. Id. at *4-6. 
Non-compliance with 28 C.F.R. §§ 16.22-16.29 was raised at the trial level, but not consid-
ered by the appellate court because the matter was so readily resolved on the relevance is-
sue. 
 164. Carter v. Miss. Dep’t Corr., No. 4:88CV213-D-B, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21118, at 
*9 (N.D. Miss. May 22, 1996). See also Exxon Shipping Co., 34 F.3d at 779-80; United Stat-
es ex rel. Roby v. Boeing, 189 F.R.D. 512 (S.D. Ohio 1999). 
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rules govern issuance of and compliance with subpoenas. “When the 
government is named as a party to an action, it is placed in the same 
position as a private litigant, and the rules of discovery in the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure apply.”165 
 Petitioners in Streett v. United States166 were the subject of an IRS 
investigation. They issued subpoenas to two IRS agents and an IRS 
group manager, all of whom were involved in the investigation.167 
Citing Touhy-type agency regulations, the IRS sought quashal.168 The 
district court rejected the argument that the agency regulation and 
Touhy “may be used as a tool by the executive” in a case to which the 
United States is a party.169 “Our legal system would not endure long . 
. . [if] a party to a dispute [could] double[] as the referee.”170 
B.   Cases in Which the Sixth Amendment is at Issue 
 To summarize: (1) federal agents and agencies are immune from 
subpoenas issuing out of state courts, unless the Federal Govern-
ment chooses to waive that immunity; (2) federal agents and agen-
cies are not immune from, and must obey, subpoenas issuing out of 
federal courts; but, (3) with respect to subpoenas duces tecum, agency 
or departmental regulations identifying a custodian of records are 
binding, and subpoenas duces tecum directed to someone other than 
the custodian are unenforceable. Courts may disagree about the de-
tails of subpoena enforcement,171 but there seems to be general 
agreement that federal courts have, and must exercise, power to de-
cide what evidence shall be produced before them. Application of a 
contrary rule—abandoning to the executive branch the power to de-
cide what evidence shall or shall not be produced—would “raise seri-
ous separation of powers questions.”172 Of course a federal agent to 
whom, or an agency to which, a subpoena is directed may assert ap-
plicable privileges and defenses; in this respect the agent or agency is 
in no different shoes than a private actor would be. 
                                                                                                                    
 165. Exxon Shipping Co., 34 F.3d at 776 n.4 (citing United States v. Procter & Gamble 
Co., 356 U.S. 677, 681 (1958) and Mosseller v. United States, 158 F.2d 380 (2d Cir. 1946)). 
 166. No. 96-M-6-H, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19898 (W.D. Va. Dec. 18, 1996). 
 167. Id. at *2. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at *12. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Compare Exxon Shipping Co. v. United States Dep’t of Interior, 34 F.3d 774 (9th 
Cir. 1994) (enforcement pursuant to federal rules of procedure and evidence), with EPA v. 
Gen. Elec. Co., 197 F.3d 592 (2d Cir. 1999) (enforcement pursuant to standards and proce-
dures of APA). 
 172. In re Boeh, 25 F.3d 761, 772 (9th Cir. 1994) (Norris, J., dissenting). See also id. at 
768 (Norris, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1953) (“Ju-
dicial control over the evidence in a case cannot be abdicated to the caprice of executive of-
ficers.”) and United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974)). 
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 Given the foregoing jurisprudence, the civil litigant in federal 
court who issues a subpoena in good faith to a federal agent or 
agency, calling for testimony or documents not privileged and which 
the subpoena recipient is capable (in fact and in law) of providing, 
should have every expectation that his subpoena will be honored or, 
if necessary, enforced. If the subpoena is ad testificandum, resistance 
based on Touhy regulations is unjustifiable. If the subpoena is duces 
tecum and directed to the officer identified in Touhy regulations, re-
sistance is unjustifiable. If resistance purports to be based on the 
unwritten constitutional doctrine of sovereign immunity, the private 
litigant will properly urge the inapplicability of that doctrine, and 
may counter with the assertion of an unwritten constitutional doc-
trine of his own: separation of powers. Federal courts, not federal 
agencies, must decide what evidence shall be produced before those 
courts. 
1.   Federal Cases 
 How much greater, then, should be the confidence of a defendant 
in a federal criminal case that the subpoena he propounds to a fed-
eral agent will be honored. He is armed with all the rights and ar-
guments with which his civil congener is able to carry the day—plus 
that sockdolager, the Sixth Amendment. Curiously, however, the 
cases considering the exercise by a federal criminal defendant seem 
to point in every direction but the true one: that his compulsory proc-
ess right is paramount to all objections and arguments urged against 
it, and cannot be burdened in its exercise by unauthorized and un-
reasonable conditions precedent. 
 Some of the confusion may result from the seeming irreconcilabil-
ity of, on the one hand, the existence of executive privilege,173 and on 
the other, the existence of a compulsory process power in the hands 
of every federal criminal defendant to which no one—not even those 
at the highest levels of government—may plead an immunity. This 
irreconcilability, however, is a chimera. No one disputes the exis-
tence of executive privilege. The question is not whether executive 
privilege exists, but who shall decide whether the privilege applies in 
a given case—the judiciary or the executive? Ironically, the regula-
tions actually considered by the Supreme Court in Touhy conceded 
that, in the final analysis, the decision rested with the courts. “Sup-
plement No. 2” to Department of Justice Order 3229, dated June 6, 
1947, provided: 
It is not necessary to bring the required documents into the court 
room and on the witness stand when it is the intention of the offi-
cer or employee [not to produce the evidence pursuant to depart-
                                                                                                                    
 173.  See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 703-16. 
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mental regulation]. If questioned, the officer or employee should 
state that the material is at hand and can be submitted to the court 
for determination as to its materiality to the case and whether in 
the best public interests the information should be disclosed.174 
Such a procedure was calculated to secure to a defendant his compul-
sory process rights. The subpoenaed evidence would be submitted to 
the court in camera. If the court determined that the evidence was 
irrelevant, or that a valid assertion of executive privilege was made, 
it would exclude the evidence. But that determination was to be 
made by the judge, based upon his evaluation of the relevance of, and 
need for confidentiality as to, a particular item of evidence in the 
context of a trial over which he was presiding. It was not to be made 
by an executive-branch mandarin, removed (in every sense) from the 
litigation in which the demised evidence was sought. 
 Compare the regulation presently appearing at 28 C.F.R. § 
16.26.175 The factors that “Department officials and attorneys” are to 
consider in determining whether or not to comply with a duly-issued 
subpoena are no doubt among the factors that the district judge 
would consider in determining whether to enforce compliance with a 
duly-issued subpoena. But the regulations proceed from the premise 
that the enforcement decision is taken away from the district court, 
and that the decision of the executive bureaucracy is final.176  
                                                                                                                    
 174. United States ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen, 340 U.S. 462, 464 (1951) (emphasis added). 
 175. Section 16.26, captioned “Considerations in determining whether production or 
disclosure should be made pursuant to a demand [i.e. a subpoena]” provides, in pertinent 
part: 
 (a) In deciding whether to make disclosures pursuant to a demand, Depart-
ment officials and attorneys should consider: 
 (1) Whether such disclosure is appropriate under the rules of procedure gov-
erning the case or matter in which the demand arose, and 
 (2) Whether disclosure is appropriate under the relevant substantive law con-
cerning privilege. 
 (b) Among the demands in response to which disclosure will not be made by 
any Department official are those demands with respect to which any of the fol-
lowing factors exist: 
 (1) Disclosure would violate a statute, such as the income tax laws, 26 U.S.C. 
6103 and 7213, or a rule of procedure, such as the grand jury secrecy rule, 
F.R.Cr.P., Rule 6(e), 
 (2) Disclosure would violate a specific regulation; 
 (3) Disclosure would reveal classified information, unless appropriately de-
classified by the originating agency, 
 (4) Disclosure would reveal a confidential source or informant, unless the in-
vestigative agency and the source or informant have no objection, 
 (5) Disclosure would reveal investigatory records compiled for law enforcement 
purposes, and would interfere with enforcement proceedings or disclose investi-
gative techniques and procedures the effectiveness of which would thereby be 
impaired, [or] 
 (6) Disclosure would improperly reveal trade secrets without the owner’s con-
sent. 
 176. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 16.25, 16.27-16.28 (2001). 
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 Inexplicably, federal courts have bought into this notion hook, line 
and sinker. The defendant in United States v. Gentry177 was charged 
with the possession of a kilo of cocaine with intent to distribute. He 
caused to be issued a “trial subpoena which seeks the testimony of 
FBI Special Agent Ray Spoon who now is stationed in another 
state.”178 Although the subpoena was ad testificandum, not duces te-
cum, the prosecution cited Touhy in support of its motion to quash.179 
The district court, in granting quashal, construed Touhy to mean 
that the “information possessed by Agent Spoon is actually the prop-
erty of the Attorney General and may be subject to various claims of 
privilege.”180 This is a remarkable statement; actually, two remark-
able statements. The Attorney General of the United States has no 
cognizable property interest in Agent Spoon (the Thirteenth 
Amendment settled that question definitively), nor in observations 
Agent Spoon made as a percipient witness to crime, nor in testimony 
that Agent Spoon is capable of giving. Neither Touhy nor any other 
authority sets forth a theory of vested property rights pursuant to 
which executive departments own the truth and rent it out for use in 
trial. In the parlance of the courthouse, lawyers often speak of “my 
witness” or “my exhibit,” but such locutions are simply a form of oral 
shorthand, not a theory of evidence law. Whatever Touhy has been 
stretched to mean, it has never been stretched to mean what the 
Gentry court said. 
 Of course it is true that Agent Spoon’s testimony “may be subject 
to various claims of privilege”—the second of the remarkable asser-
tions reflected in the quoted language from Gentry.181 Every piece of 
evidence to be offered in every trial to be conducted in America may 
be subject to various claims of privilege. But if the Department of 
Justice had a good-faith basis to believe that portions of Agent 
Spoon’s testimony actually were subject to specific claims of privilege, 
the assistant U.S. attorney prosecuting Gentry was free to raise 
those claims by way of an appropriate objection.182 Federal judges 
                                                                                                                    
 177. No. 92 CR 588, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5517 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 27, 1995). 
 178. Id. at *1. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. at *2. In fairness to the district court, this observation was merely dictum. The 
court actually resolved the matter on grounds of relevance: The defendant sought Agent 
Spoon’s testimony in support of a defense of duress or coercion, which defense the court de-
termined to be inadmissible. “Because Gentry’s proffer is insufficient as a matter of law, 
the Court grants the Government’s motion in limine to preclude the assertion of a duress 
defense before the jury. This conclusion moots the issue of Agent Spoon’s potential testi-
mony and the Court will quash that subpoena.” Id. at *14. 
 181. Id. at *2. 
 182. Assume, for example, that in the course of his involvement in the Gentry investi-
gation, Spoon overheard confidential conversations between the President of the United 
States and the Prime Minister of Israel (an absurd example; but there is nothing in the 
Gentry opinion to suggest that the assertion of privilege the prosecution would actually 
have made—if it had ever been called upon to make one—would have been less absurd). 
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bristle with indignation at the sort of executive-branch steamrolling 
visited upon Gentry when it arises in a civil case.183 In a criminal 
case, in which the private litigant’s right to compulsory process is of 
constitutional dimension, the same courts seem strangely apathetic.  
 One expression of this apathy is a theory federal courts have de-
veloped to avoid the constitutional issue that arises when the execu-
tive branch seeks to burden, by the imposition of conditions prece-
dent, the exercise of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to com-
pulsory process. The defendant in United States v. Allen184 issued a 
subpoena to the United States attorney for the jurisdiction in which 
he was convicted. The subpoena was not accompanied by the state-
ment prescribed in the regulations, viz. a statement or affidavit set-
ting forth the witness’s expected testimony.185 The subpoenaed 
“prosecutor advised the court that he declined to testify since he did 
not have permission to testify under regulations governing testimony 
by Department of Justice personnel.”186 Confronted with this outright 
refusal on the part of the subpoenaed witness to comply with the ex-
ercise of the defendant’s constitutional compulsory process right, the 
appellate court saw no constitutional issue: 
We do not have the problem . . . of whether the [trial] court should 
have rejected a refusal by the Department due to the constitu-
tional guarantees of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Since the 
defendant did not follow the procedure and submit the required 
summary of testimony desired, the Department made no decision 
whether the prosecutor could testify and we do not reach the con-
stitutional claim.187 
This is Alice-through-the-looking-glass jurisprudence. The Depart-
ment of Justice witness had been subpoenaed. The Department of 
Justice replied, in effect, “Because you have not told us what you 
want to ask and why you think it matters, we will instruct the wit-
ness to ignore your subpoena.” So instructed, the witness refused to 
testify. Squarely before the court was the issue whether the condition 
precedent imposed by the Department of Justice on the otherwise-
unconditioned exercise of a constitutional right was lawful. Suppose, 
                                                                                                                    
Had the prosecution filed a motion in limine as to the confidential material (which motion 
the court would no doubt have received ex parte, and granted), privilege would have been 
preserved without shredding Gentry’s constitutional right to compulsory process. 
 183. See Streett v. United States, No. 96-M-6-H, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19898, at *11-
13 (W.D. Va. Dec. 18, 1996); Carter v. Miss. Dep’t Corr., No. 4:8CV213-D-B, 1996 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 21118, at *9 (N.D. Miss. May 22, 1996); and discussion supra Part V.A.2. 
 184. 554 F.2d 398 (10th Cir. 1977). 
 185. Id. at 406. 
 186. Id. Although the opinion states that the subpoena was duces tecum, there is no 
reference to production of documents. As the quoted language reflects, the witness refused 
to testify, citing 28 C.F.R. §§ 16.22, 16.23 (1974). Id. 
 187. Id. at 407. 
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by way of example, that the regulations read as follows: Before any 
Department of Justice employee will be permitted to comply with a 
subpoena issued by a criminal defendant in a pending case, the de-
fendant issuing the subpoena must quack like a duck. Conceptually, 
this regulation is indistinguishable from those actually propounded 
by the Department of Justice. If a defendant refuses to quack and 
stands upon his constitutional right, he is entitled to a determination 
from the court whether the quacking requirement is a lawful, or an 
unlawful, burden upon his compulsory process power. Such a deter-
mination would include consideration of the nature of the constitu-
tional right at issue, the nature of the condition placed upon it, the 
justification of the condition, the legislative grant of power support-
ing the condition, and so on. At the end of the day, the court might 
conclude that the condition was a constitutionally-permissible bur-
den upon the exercise of the defendant’s right, or it might conclude 
the opposite. But the issue would be squarely before the court, and 
could not be avoided. 
 Standing legal analysis on its head, courts have taken the position 
that it is only by complying with the conditions—only by quacking—
that the defendant can preserve his entitlement to a judicial deter-
mination of the constitutionality of the regulations. Citing Allen, the 
court in United States v. Marino188 had this to say: 
Because the defendants never complied with the procedures [set 
out in the regulations] to demand testimony, the government de-
nied their request [i.e. ignored their subpoenas]. . . . The question 
of whether these procedures deny the defendants their Sixth 
Amendment right to call and cross-examine witnesses is not 
reached until the defendants follow the procedures and then have 
their demands denied. Because Marino and Castello failed to make 
a demand in accordance with 28 C.F.R. § 16.23(c), they have no 
constitutional claim.189 
But the law is to the contrary: Had the defendants complied with the 
procedures described in the regulations, they would have waived, 
rather than perfected, their constitutional objections to those proce-
dures. Had the Department of Justice then refused to honor the sub-
poenas, the defendants would have sought enforcement, not on the 
grounds of the Sixth Amendment, but on the grounds of the regula-
tions themselves. By refusing to comply with the regulations, the de-
fendants preserved intact their claim that the regulations constituted 
an unlawful burden upon their Sixth Amendment right to compul-
sory process—a claim that the court, by operation of the peculiar 
logic reflected in the excerpted paragraph supra, never reached. Al-
though neither the Supreme Court nor Congress has ever put its im-
                                                                                                                    
 188. 658 F.2d 1120 (6th Cir. 1981). 
 189. Id. at 1125 (citing Allen, 554 F.2d. at 406). 
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primatur on the Attorney General’s claim to control, even to the 
point of barring, eyewitness testimony by all present and former De-
partment of Justice employees, federal courts continue, inexplicably, 
to treat as closed the constitutional question raised by that claim.190 
 As noted supra page 114, the regulations require that a defendant 
seeking to subpoena a Department of Justice employee must append 
to the subpoena a statement of what testimony the defense expects to 
adduce from the witness.191 Courts have required exacting compli-
ance with this requirement. The defendants in United States v. 
Cleveland192 subpoenaed several of the FBI agents who participated 
in the investigation that led to the defendants’ prosecution. All the 
subpoenaed agents had already testified for the prosecution during 
the government’s case-in-chief.193 Nevertheless, the defendants com-
plied with the requirements of the regulations by submitting 
a statement notifying [the U.S. attorney’s office] that each subpoe-
naed witness would be called to testify regarding (1) the [tape-
recorded telephone] conversation monitored by [such agent] that 
would be introduced into evidence; (2) other conversations [that 
the agents] monitored on the wiretap; (3) the authenticity of those 
conversations; and (4) other steps taken by them in this investiga-
tion.194 
Certainly the foregoing summary of proposed testimony was ade-
quate to adumbrate any issues of executive privilege, and to enable 
both the prosecution and the court to consider how best to respond. 
Certainly the proposed testimony would be directly relevant to the 
case. But the prosecution argued, and the court agreed, that this 
summary of proposed testimony was insufficiently complete and par-
ticular to satisfy the regulations: 
The Court finds that a sufficient summary must designate the spe-
cific tapes about which each witness may be expected to give tes-
timony by date and participants, or some other identifying refer-
                                                                                                                    
 190. See, e.g., United States v. Wallace, 32 F.3d 921, 929 (5th Cir. 1994) (“The Depart-
ment of Justice regulations for subpoenaing witnesses [ad testificandum in a criminal case] 
have been held to be valid and mandatory. . . . Because the defendants failed to [submit a 
summary of the testimony sought] . . . we do not reach their constitutional claims.”); 
United States v. Bizzard, 674 F.2d 1382, 1387 (11th Cir. 1982) (“Defendant’s argument 
that these regulations are unconstitutional under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments over-
looks the case of United States v. Ragen [sic].”); State v. Reyes, 816 F. Supp. 619, 623 n.2 
(E.D. Cal. 1992). But cf. McClure v. United States, No. 93-35835, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 
11809, at *3 n.1 (9th Cir. May 17, 1995) (treating the constitutional issue as unresolved 
and a matter of concern). 
 191. 28 C.F.R. § 16.23 (2001). In a case in which the United States is not a party, 28 
C.F.R. § 16.22 requires a statement both of the testimony sought and of its relevance to the 
proceedings. 
 192. No. 96-207, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7359 (E.D. La. May 22, 1997). 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. at *4 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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ence understandable to both parties. In addition, a sufficient 
summary must also specify whether the witness is expected solely 
to authenticate the tape or whether she or he is also expected to 
give substantive testimony about the tapes, but the specific nature 
of the substantive testimony need not be described. Finally, the 
Court finds that the defendants’ general statement that these wit-
nesses will all be asked to testify as to “other steps taken by them 
in this investigation” is too broad to satisfy the regulation. A suffi-
cient summary must generally identify the steps in the investiga-
tion about which the witness might be asked (e.g., execution of 
search warrant; interview of witness).195 
In the pressure-cooker of the trial courtroom, it is difficult enough for 
a trial lawyer to know where his own carefully-prepared witness’s 
testimony will lead. To ask defense counsel to state with the level of 
specificity demanded by the court what he will ask a witness with 
whom he has never been permitted to discuss the facts of the case196 
is wholly unworkable.197 
 But the principal objection to the demand in the Department of 
Justice regulations of a summary of proposed testimony as a condi-
tion precedent to compliance with a subpoena to a Department of 
Justice employee is not that such a precondition is unworkable or 
impractical. The principal objection is that the regulations in their 
present form burden, in a manner not authorized by the legislature 
nor approved by the Supreme Court, the proper exercise of a criminal 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment privilege. By requiring defense coun-
sel to state the specific testimony he hopes to elicit from a Depart-
ment of Justice witness, the regulations oblige the defendant to sacri-
fice work-product privilege for the possibility (but not the certainty) 
that his exercise of a right secured to him by the Constitution will be 
honored.198 
                                                                                                                    
 195. Id. at *6. See also the statement actually submitted, and appended to the opinion 
of the appellate court, in United States v. Winner, 641 F.2d 825, 834-35 (10th Cir. 1981). 
 196. In a federal civil case, where all that is at issue is money, litigants can utilize all 
the principal discovery devices: depositions, interrogatories, requests for admission, re-
quests for production, and so on. In a federal criminal case, where liberty itself hangs in 
the balance, the defendant can utilize none of these discovery devices. Defense counsel has 
no power, for example, to compel a federal agent to submit to an interview or deposition 
prior to trial. 
 197. Would defense counsel be bound by the proffer he makes? If the summary of tes-
timony indicates that Agent Jones will be asked about the execution of a search warrant, 
and during the course of his testimony Jones makes reference to corruption within FBI 
ranks in connection with the present case, would defense counsel be precluded from follow-
ing up, on the grounds that the issue is beyond the scope of the statement supporting 
Jones’s subpoena? 
 198. One federal judge, marveling at regulations that purport to entitle a federal prose-
cutor to be told before the fact what testimony his adversary hoped to adduce as a 
condition precedent to his adversary’s adducing that testimony, observed that, “it would be 
Valhalla for a private lawyer to be able to get a preview of an adverse witness’s cross-
examination.” United States v. Feeney, 501 F. Supp. 1324, 1325 (D. Colo. 1980). 
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 The hypothetical at the outset of this article—the case of United 
States v. Jill Defendant—is a stripped-down version of (among many 
other cases) United States v. Wallace.199 In Wallace, 
the government rested its case without having called two of the 
witnesses that had been listed on its prospective witness list, DEA 
Agent John Houston and U.S. Border Patrol Agent William Ras-
bury. This action surprised the defendants, because Houston and 
Rasbury were on a list read to the jury as “witnesses that the gov-
ernment may use,” and the government had already produced 
Jencks Act material in anticipation of their possible testimony. 
Houston and Rasbury were present in the hallway on the last day 
of the government’s case, and counsel for Wallace had spoken to 
them about their anticipated testimony. After the government 
rested without calling Houston or Rasbury, defendants attempted 
that evening to subpoena the two agents to testify for the de-
fense.200 
Prior to the time the government rested its case, defense counsel had 
no reason to believe that the agents would not testify in the prosecu-
tion case-in-chief, and every reason to believe that they would. Not 
only had the agents been identified to the jury as likely prosecution 
witnesses, but the assistant U.S. attorney handling the case had also 
turned over Jencks statements—an all-but-certain sign that a wit-
ness will be called.201 The government’s failure to call the witnesses 
naturally raised the prospect in the minds of defense counsel that the 
agents knew something that could benefit the defense or undermine 
the prosecution. Defense counsel could only speculate what that 
“something” was, and whether (and how) it could safely be elicited by 
the defense on direct examination of the agents. But such speculation 
is work-product in the case, and privileged as such. 
 The work-product privilege received the imprimatur of the United 
States Supreme Court in Hickman v. Taylor.202 The doctrine, as de-
scribed in Hickman, extends not only to documentary work-product, 
but also to mental work-product.203 In civil practice, the privilege is 
codified in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3), which expressly 
                                                                                                                    
 199. 32 F.3d 921 (5th Cir. 1994). 
 200. Id. at 928. 
 201. Although a federal criminal defendant has no discovery rights (as discovery is un-
derstood in federal civil cases; see supra note 196), he is entitled to inspect certain witness 
statements in certain circumstances. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2000). These statements are re-
ferred to in courthouse argot as “Jencks statements.” But the prosecution is not obliged to 
produce Jencks statements until after the witness in question has testified. Thus, for a 
prosecutor to provide Jencks statements for a witness who has yet to testify is a virtually 
certain indication that the witness is about to testify. 
 202. 329 U.S. 495 (1947). 
 203. Id. at 511 (explaining that if work product privilege did not extend to mental im-
pressions, case theorizing, and the like, “[a]n attorney’s thoughts, heretofore inviolate, 
would not be his own”). 
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extends its protection to “the mental impressions, conclusions, opin-
ions, or legal theories of an attorney . . . concerning the litigation.”204 
But “[a]lthough the work-product doctrine most frequently is as-
serted as a bar to discovery in civil litigation, its role in assuring the 
proper functioning of the criminal justice system is even more vi-
tal.”205 
 In criminal as in civil cases, the “‘opinions, judgments, and 
thought processes of counsel’ are generally protected.”206 Courts refer 
to the privilege as extending, in criminal cases, to “mental impres-
sions, opinions, conclusions, and legal strategies formed in anticipa-
tion of specific litigation”207 or to an “attorney’s mental impressions, 
conclusions, strategies, or theories.”208 Such mental impression work-
product is entitled to the very highest level of protection from inva-
sion. 
Fact work-product may be obtained upon a showing of both a sub-
stantial need and an inability to secure the substantial equivalent 
of the materials by alternate means without undue hardship. . . . 
Opinion work-product, however, . . . is more scrupulously protected 
as it represents the actual thoughts and impressions of the attor-
ney.209 
This two-tier approach to work-product privilege has prompted one 
court to refer to “the super-protective envelope reserved by Rule 
26(b)(3) for ‘mental impressions.’”210 
 The statement or affidavit required by the Department of Justice 
regulations must summarize the testimony sought from a witness in 
the adversary’s camp; and, in a state court case, must demonstrate 
the relevance of that testimony. Such a statement or affidavit com-
pletely dismasts the privilege for mental impressions, strategies, and 
theories. This forfeiture of a valuable privilege is the price federal 
                                                                                                                    
 204. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3). See also Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 400 
(1981) (stating “Rule 26 accords special protection to work product revealing the attorney’s 
mental processes”). 
 205. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 (1975). See also, e.g., United States v. 
Jacques Dessange, Inc., No. S2 99-CR1182, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3734 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 
2000); In re Sealed Case, 856 F.2d 268 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
 206. In re Sealed Case, 124 F.3d 230, 235 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (quoting In re Sealed Case, 
676 F.2d 793, 809-10 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). 
 207. United States v. One Tract Real Prop., 95 F.3d 422, 428 (6th Cir. 1996). 
 208. Jacques Dessange, 2000 U.S. Dist LEXIS 3734, at *2 (citing United States v. Adl-
man, 134 F.3d 1194, 1197 (2d Cir. 1998)). 
 209. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 102 F.3d 748, 750 (4th Cir. 1996) (internal quota-
tions and citations omitted). See also In re Steinhardt Partners, L.P., 9 F.3d 230, 234 (2d 
Cir. 1993) (stating that “[a]n attorney’s protected thought processes include preparing legal 
theories, planning litigation strategies and trial tactics, and sifting through information”); 
Jacques Dessange, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3734, at *5 (stating that “[a] heightened stan-
dard of protection must be accorded ‘opinion’ work product that reveals an attorney’s men-
tal impressions and legal theories”) 
 210. In re Sealed Case, 124 F.3d at 236. 
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courts oblige criminal defendants to pay, not to assure that an execu-
tive-branch officer will honor a subpoena he is constitutionally bound 
to honor, but merely to assure that the Department of Justice will 
consider permitting the executive-branch officer to honor a subpoena 
he is constitutionally bound to honor. To the extent that agency regu-
lations require subpoenas duces tecum to be served on the agency 
head or his designee, such regulations are a valid exercise of the 
housekeeping power. To the extent that agency regulations purport 
to condition compliance with a subpoena ad testificandum upon sur-
render by a federal criminal defendant of his work-product privilege, 
such regulations are an invalid burden upon the Sixth Amendment 
right to compulsory process; and are in no sense justified by the 
“housekeeping” statute. The complicity of federal courts in this ex-
ecutive-branch overreaching and abuse is inexplicable. The whole 
business of requiring a summary or affidavit in support of a defen-
dant’s compulsory process right was debunked by Chief Justice Mar-
shall in the Aaron Burr treason litigation.211 In support of Burr’s ap-
plication for a subpoena duces tecum to President Jefferson, Burr and 
his co-counsel did submit an affidavit;212 although the affidavit is not 
quoted or summarized in the reported opinions, it appears that the 
affidavit was simply one of good faith.213  
It is only because the subpoena is to those who administer the gov-
ernment of this country, that such an affidavit was required as 
would furnish probable cause to believe that the testimony was de-
sired for the real purposes of defence, and not for such [other pur-
poses] as this court will forever discountenance [e.g. harassment, 
delay, or the like].214 
 The prosecution argued that the defendant’s bare assertion of his 
belief that the demised evidence was relevant was inadequate. Burr, 
according to the prosecution, should have made the sort of detailed 
proffer required by the present-day Code of Federal Regulations. 
This argument Chief Justice Marshall easily rejected: 
[Burr] has made his affidavit [that the demised evidence is mate-
rial]. But that is said [by the prosecution] to be insufficient; and 
why? Because the averment is, that the [evidence sought] “may be 
material” in the defence. Until the course of the prosecution shall 
be fully developed, it may not be in the power of the accused to 
make a more positive averment. The importance of the [evidence] 
to the defence, may depend on the testimony adduced by the prose-
cutor . . . . It is objected that the particular passages of the [evi-
dence] which are required are not pointed out. But how can this be 
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done while the [evidence] itself is withheld? Or how can their ap-
plicability be shown without requiring the accused prematurely to 
disclose his defence?215 
 Consider again the hypothetical appearing at the outset of this 
Article. The case against Jill Defendant was made by Agents Smith 
and Jones. The prosecution called Smith in its case-in-chief, then 
rested without calling Jones. Jill’s lawyer cannot know why Jones did 
not testify for the prosecution; he can do no more than speculate. His 
speculation will be informed by his knowledge of the facts of the case; 
his “taking the temperature of the courtroom” (placing particular 
emphasis on his assessment of the jury’s reaction to his cross-
examination of Smith); his own prior experience, if any, with the 
prosecutor and with Jones; courthouse scuttlebutt about the prosecu-
tor and about Jones and about the progress of the case; and a variety 
of other factors as well. Perhaps the prosecutor believes, based on his 
own prior experience, that Jones does poorly on cross-examination. 
Perhaps Jones has been ill lately. Perhaps, too, Jones will fail to cor-
roborate Smith’s testimony in important particulars; or that Jones is 
not as certain about something as Smith was; or that Jones harbors 
poorly concealed suspicions about the truthfulness of the warrant af-
fidavit Smith swore to, or the testimony he gave. What summary of 
expected testimony can Jill’s lawyer give in support of his subpoena 
to Jones? A truthful summary might recite: 
 I, Jill Defendant’s lawyer, am not entirely sure what I need to 
ask Jones. I’ll start out with some questions about the history of 
his involvement with Smith on this case and see where that takes 
me, but of course I’ll have to be careful not to give Jones a chance 
to vouch for Smith or bolster Smith’s credibility. I may try to point 
out that during the surveillance Jones wasn’t positioned where 
Smith was and that the two may have seen things differently, but 
of course I won’t know how far to pursue that line of examination 
until I get Jones to commit to where he was standing, what the 
lighting conditions were, and what he saw. I have a gut feeling 
that Jones believes that the woman’s voice on the last taped tele-
phone conversation was Jill’s sister Jane, not Jill herself (as Smith 
said it was), but I won’t know if I dare to ask him that until I see 
how the cross is going. Depending on his demeanor and tone of 
voice when he describes Smith’s role in the case and his own work-
ing relationship with Smith, I may go so far as to pose a series of 
questions calling Smith’s accuracy as an observer (and, by implica-
tion, his integrity) into question, but of course I can’t know now 
whether I’ll go that far. 
Other than its candor and truthfulness, the foregoing has nothing to 
commend it. It surely constitutes a waiver of every vestige of work-
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product privilege. The attorney has divulged the entirety of his men-
tal impressions, tactics, and conclusion. And it has probably pur-
chased him nothing, because the statement is insufficiently specific 
to satisfy the Department of Justice chain of command or the federal 
courts.216 
 If Jill’s lawyer wants to preserve work-product privilege intact, he 
may revise his statement or affidavit to read as follows: 
 I, Jill Defendant’s lawyer, seek to question Agent Jones about 
his involvement in the surveillance conducted in the investigation 
of this case. 
It is unlikely that a Department of Justice functionary or a district 
court will deem the foregoing sufficiently specific to comply with the 
regulations. But what happens if Jones is permitted to testify and, in 
the middle of a line of questions about surveillance, blurts out a sug-
gestion that Smith may have coerced Jill into confessing? Jill’s law-
yer, of course, pounces on the answer and seeks to pose follow-up 
questions. The prosecutor objects; the statement in support of the 
subpoena that brings Jones here makes reference only to surveil-
lance, not at all to interrogation. Was the purpose of the statement 
merely to demonstrate the existence of a bona-fide line of questioning 
sufficient to justify bringing Agent Jones to court? If so, the purpose 
of the statement (and of the regulations) was satisfied, and the de-
fense should be permitted to follow up with questions about any rele-
vant matter—as, for example, circumstances anent Jill’s confession 
that render it unreliable. Or was the purpose of the statement to af-
ford the government an opportunity to determine if it had before-the-
fact objections, on grounds of privilege or anything else, to the sub-
ject matter of the examination? If so, Jill’s lawyer is bound by his 
statement; if he wants to examine Agent Jones about Agent Smith’s 
interrogation excesses, he must re-subpoena Jones, appending a new 
summary of expected testimony. 
 These questions have not been addressed, much less resolved, in 
the case law. But these questions should never arise. The course of a 
criminal trial—or of any single witness examination within that 
trial—is no more predictable than the course of life itself. Jill’s law-
yer does not know, cannot know, much of what he will ask Agent 
Jones until Jones takes the stand. To oblige Jones to take the stand, 
Jill’s constitutionally-guaranteed compulsory process power should 
be all that is needed. The power consigned to executive department 
heads by the “housekeeping” statute is ample to enable those de-
partment heads to control departmental responses to subpoenas 
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duces tecum. That grant of power was not intended to, and should not 
enable executive-branch employees and officers to place obstacles be-
fore the good-faith exercise of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment 
rights—particularly when one of the obstacles is the forfeiture of the 
precious work-product privilege.  
 Assume Jill’s lawyer is a member in good standing of the bar.  As 
such, his issuance of a subpoena on Jill’s behalf is presumed to be in 
good faith and not for the purposes of harassing witnesses or delay-
ing proceedings. If it appears to the court that Jill’s lawyer has acted 
in bad faith, the court (and the state bar) have powerful remedies at 
their disposal. If the Department of Justice has privileges or objec-
tions to assert, it can do so pretrial, at trial, or both.217 But the De-
partment of Justice cannot arrogate to itself the power to flout the 
Sixth Amendment, to stretch the “housekeeping” statute out of all 
proportion, and to determine dispositively what testimony shall and 
shall not be called for before Article III courts. 
2.   State Cases 
 Pity the criminal defendant in state court. He suffers from all the 
disabilities that afflict other litigants considered hereinabove, as well 
as another that is unique to him. Like the state court civil litigant, he 
bumps up against the immovable object that is sovereign immunity. 
Like the federal court criminal defendant, he is hobbled by the re-
quirement that he provide the Department of Justice a summary of 
the testimony he hopes to elicit. There is, of course, nothing confiden-
tial about this summary, and no reason to believe that Department of 
Justice prosecutors will not immediately share it with their state 
court colleagues charged with the prosecution of the case in which 
the testimony is sought. And, in addition to summarizing the pro-
posed testimony, he—unlike his federal court congener—must ex-
pressly proffer its relevance. 
 Perhaps for these reasons there is a relatively small corpus of ju-
risprudence dealing with state criminal cases. What jurisprudence 
there is is not always well thought out. One federal court to which a 
motion to quash subpoena was removed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442 
inexplicably concluded that it lacked removal jurisdiction.218 One 
state court appeared to claim an authority to order the Attorney 
General of the United States to comply with a state court subpoena, 
                                                                                                                    
 217. See Burr I, 25 F. Cas. at 37: 
“If [the demised evidence] does contain any matter which it would be imprudent 
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General of the United States to comply with a state court subpoena, 
the doctrine of sovereign immunity notwithstanding.219 
 Typically, the issue of subpoena compliance by a federal actor 
arises when a state court criminal defendant claims that he was act-
ing as an informer, or otherwise at the behest of federal law enforce-
ment, in connection with the conduct for which he is being prose-
cuted. The state defendant then seeks to subpoena a federal agent to 
corroborate this theory of defense. That was the case in Buford.220 In 
Louisiana v. Parker,221 
[t]he defendant testified at his trial. He stated that he was a long-
time informant for the FBI. The defendant admitted that he was in 
northeast Louisiana the weekend of the murder, but said that he 
was attempting to gather evidence for the FBI on some drug deal-
ers. He also claimed that his FBI agent-contact, Ralph DiFonso, 
could corroborate his testimony. However, the Department of Jus-
tice invoked a special FBI privilege preventing the agent from tes-
tifying.222 
The “special FBI privilege,” of course, was simply the applicable pro-
visions of the C.F.R.223 
 On such facts, state courts, and federal courts exercising state 
court removal jurisdiction, almost invariably uphold the power of the 
Federal Government to resist state court visitorial process.224 Some-
times the ruling is based, properly, on sovereign immunity.225 Too of-
ten, courts conjure up some notion of “a special FBI [or DEA, etc.] 
privilege.”226 
 Samuel Johnson was a defendant in state court in California. He 
faced two counts of “homicide with special circumstances” for which 
the state prosecution was seeking the death penalty.227 
Through information obtained during discovery, Johnson’s attor-
neys became aware of the possibility that several of the prosecu-
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tion’s proposed witnesses were in the United States illegally. 
Johnson’s attorneys came to believe that these witnesses’ immigra-
tion files might contain information that would undermine their 
credibility as well as provide other exculpatory evidence . . . . 
Johnson’s attorneys subpoenaed these witnesses’ immigration files 
from [Charles H. DeMore, who at that time was] the Custodian of 
Records of the [Immigration and Naturalization Service].228 
The local U.S. attorney’s office intervened, moving to quash the sub-
poenas on the grounds of sovereign immunity and of the failure of 
Johnson’s attorneys to comply with the procedures embodied in the 
CFR. When the state court judge sought to enforce the subpoenas, 
the U.S. attorney’s office had the matter removed to U.S. district 
court.229 The federal court cited Touhy as supporting the regulations, 
and non-compliance with the regulations as supporting quashal of 
the subpoenas.230 
 Undeterred, Johnson’s lawyers continued to investigate and pre-
pare the case. They learned that one Gabriela Gomez was “a key 
prosecution witness whose testimony . . . connected Johnson with the 
victims in th[e] case.”231 
Johnson’s attorneys believed Gomez to be in the Federal Witness 
Protection Program and that her participation in that program in-
duced a change in her testimony. It was also believed that [Agent 
Paul] Massock [of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms] 
was integral in securing Gomez in the Witness Protection Program 
. . . . Johnson’s attorneys also learned that Massock was involved 
in the investigation leading to Johnson’s arrest. In an effort to gain 
further information about the investigation and Gomez, Johnson[’s 
attorneys] subpoenaed Massock to testify and produce records con-
cerning his participation in the investigation as well as his knowl-
edge of Gomez.232 
The Massock litigation then followed in the footsteps of the DeMore 
case. Again the state judge sought to enforce the subpoenas. Again 
federal prosecutors removed the matter to U.S. district court. In 
again granting quashal, the federal judge cribbed from his prior opin-
ion in DeMore.233 
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 Whether in proper reliance upon the doctrine of sovereign immu-
nity, or on an overreading of Touhy and the regulations alleged to be 
premised upon Touhy, courts are apparently unwilling to enforce the 
subpoenas of state court criminal defendants issued to federal actors 
when those subpoenas are not accompanied by the affidavits or 
statements called for by the various provisions of the Code of Federal 
Regulations. But what of the state-court defendant who complies, or 
at least attempts to comply, with these regulations? Assume that the 
defendant in a state court criminal case has a bona fide need to call a 
federal agent or employee as a trial witness. Assume further that he 
has scrupulously complied with the Code of Federal Regulations, bar-
ing his soul (and his theory of defense) to the Department of Justice 
by setting forth a summary of the testimony he hopes to elicit from 
the federal actor and the relevance of that testimony to the state 
court trial. Finally, assume that the Department of Justice has de-
termined, for reasons known only to it, to resist the defendant’s sub-
poena. Does the defendant have any remedy at all? 
 On the present state of the law, many courts have concluded that 
the answer is an unvarnished “no.” Courts holding out the hope of 
remedy generally look to one or both of two possible sources of rem-
edy: the state court itself or the Administrative Procedure Act. 
 State v. Tascarella234 is the easy case. Florida, unlike most states, 
affords criminal defendants the qualified right to take depositions of 
material witnesses before trial.235 The prosecution listed no fewer 
than eleven DEA agents as material witnesses to the case against 
Mr. and Mrs. Tascarella.236 The Tascarellas’ attorney duly noticed 
these witnesses for deposition. The agents, relying on instructions 
from the Department of Justice chain of command, declined to ap-
pear.237 The trial court, recognizing that contempt was not a possible 
remedy,238 simply refused to allow the witnesses to testify at trial for 
the prosecution. The state supreme court approved this exercise of 
the trial court’s power to control the proceedings before it; in effect 
taking the position that if federal agents wanted their cases prose-
cuted in state court, they had better be prepared to play by state 
court rules.239 
                                                                                                                    
language employed by the court in Massock was identical to that employed by the court in 
its earlier opinion in DeMore. 
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 The facts of Tascarella are unique, or nearly so. Because it was 
the prosecution, and not the defense, that wanted to elicit the testi-
mony of the federal agents at trial, the state trial court could afford 
the defendants a complete remedy by simply excluding those wit-
nesses for their non-compliance with state procedural law. In 
virtually every case other than Tascarella, however, it is the defense 
that seeks the testimony of uncooperative federal agents. Although 
state trial courts may have discretionary power to dismiss charges 
outright in cases in which federal agents refuse to honor a defense 
trial subpoena, Tascarella provides no precedent for the exercise of 
such a power. 
 In re Gray240 began in the criminal courts of the State of Okla-
homa. Defendant Dewayne E. Hopkins caused a subpoena having 
both ad testificandum and duces tecum provisions to be served on 
FBI Agent Ed Gray.241 There is no suggestion in the opinion that 
Hopkins’s need for Gray’s testimony, and for the documents associ-
ated with that testimony, was other than bona fide. Citing 28 C.F.R. 
§§ 16.22-16.29, the Department of Justice instructed Gray to dis-
honor the subpoena, and removed the matter to federal court.242 
There, Hopkins squarely presented the constitutional issue: “that 5 
U.S.C. § 301, under which the regulations were promulgated, does 
not permit the government to withhold information and the regula-
tions must yield to [Hopkins’s] constitutional rights to due process, to 
confront his accusers and to compulsory process.”243 The court of ap-
peals, however, viewed the matter as not yet ripe for adjudication be-
cause Hopkins “has other remedies available. Those remedies may 
include dismissal of the charges or other ameliorative action by the 
state court . . . .”244 
 The federal appellate court’s deference to the Oklahoma courts, 
although no doubt commendable as a matter of comity, raises more 
questions than it answers. Apparently the federal court felt itself in-
sufficiently familiar with state procedural law to assert flatly that 
Hopkins would obtain relief in the state courts; it would go only so 
far as to suggest that Hopkins “may” obtain relief there. It is, of 
course, apodictic that any litigant may (or may not) obtain relief from 
any court upon any issue. Nor was the federal court at all certain 
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what form this imagined relief might take. Perhaps outright dis-
missal, perhaps some unidentified “other ameliorative action.”245 
 As a practical matter, state trial judges have few remedies at their 
command in a Hopkins-type situation. Outright dismissal deprives 
the state of its power to vindicate its interest in what may be an im-
portant criminal prosecution, and is at odds with the preference re-
flected in the Anglo-American legal tradition for resolution on the 
merits.246 At the other extreme is the approach taken by the courts in 
Andrews, Parker, and some of the other cases considered supra page 
124: the defendant is simply without a remedy. Between those two 
extremes, a state trial judge has little to work with. He cannot visit 
sanctions upon a federal agent as he would upon any other recalci-
trant witness. 
 As an alternative to a remedy in the state court system, In re 
Gray, and other cases to consider the issue, look to the Administra-
tive Procedure Act (APA).247 Conceptually, the APA provides a com-
plete remedy. As a practical matter, it provides a very incomplete 
remedy. A state court criminal defendant determines, before or per-
haps during trial, that he needs the testimony of a federal agent. 
Pursuant to the Code of Federal Regulations he prepares and sub-
mits a summary of the desired testimony and of its relevance to the 
pending or impending prosecution. Time passes. The Department of 
Justice, which no doubt considers itself to have more pressing things 
to do than to decide whether to make its agent and his testimony 
available to some unimportant state court defendant in some far-
flung corner of the Republic, will decide when it decides. The state 
court defendant can do nothing to expedite the decision process. The 
state court judge can do nothing to expedite the decision process. 
Perhaps in the fullness of time the Department decides that it will 
not comply. Now the state court defendant must become a federal 
court plaintiff, bringing a claim under the APA. A federal judge, no 
doubt with a very full docket, will consider the matter when he can. 
The state court defendant turned federal court plaintiff can do noth-
ing to expedite the federal judge’s decision process. The state court 
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judge can do nothing to expedite the federal court judge’s decision 
process. Meantime, has the criminal trial in state court not already 
begun? If it has begun, will the state court trial judge simply suspend 
the trial proceedings before him until the day that may or may not 
come in which the Federal Government will make, or will be ordered 
by a federal judge to make, its witness available? The APA may have 
great utility in many contexts, but in this context it has little. The 
criticisms made by Judge Norris in Boeh,248 are fully applicable here. 
 Perhaps the only reported case of a state court criminal defendant 
obtaining timely relief under the APA in such circumstances is that 
of Samuel Johnson. Johnson’s attempts to secure documents and tes-
timony from federal agents were rebuffed in Massock v. Superior 
Court of California249 and DeMore v. Superior Court of California.250 
His attorneys continued to believe—rightly, as it turned out—that 
evidence crucial to their client’s defense was in the hands of federal 
authorities. In Johnson v. Reno251 their persistence bore fruit. 
 It is implied, although not expressly stated, in the Johnson v. 
Reno opinion that Johnson’s lawyers bowed to necessity and at last 
submitted, in support of their subpoenas, the statements called for by 
the CFR.252 What is stated expressly is that the federal district judge 
came to conclude that Johnson’s repeated requests were more than 
justified, and that the federal agencies’ repeated ducking was less 
than justified.253 “It appears to this Court that several federal agen-
cies, including the ATF, DEA and FBI, were intimately involved in 
the investigation which led to [Johnson’s] arrest. By virtue of their 
participation in this investigation, these agencies may have in their 
possession information helpful to [Johnson’s] defense.”254 At issue 
was Johnson’s entitlement to that information. 
 The court began its analysis by citing United States v. An-
dolschek255 for the proposition “that although it is lawful for a de-
partment of the government to suppress documents, even when they 
will help determine controversies between third persons, this does 
not include the suppression of information in a criminal prosecu-
tion.”256 Andolschek was a federal prosecution for conspiracy to vio-
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late the income tax laws.257 Codefendants Ward, Nagle, and Hersko-
witz were inspectors in the “Alcohol Tax Unit”258 of the Internal 
Revenue Service who sought to obtain, for use in their defense, “cer-
tain official reports” which reflected upon their performance of their 
duties.259 The trial judge ruled that Department of the Treasury 
regulations shielded the reports from disclosure to the defendants.260 
 In holding that the non-production of the documents was reversi-
ble error, Judge Hand seems almost to proceed on a theory of waiver. 
The Federal Government had brought charges against its former 
agents. The Federal Government possessed documents, putatively 
confidential, that were alleged to be relevant to those charges. “The 
government must choose; either it must leave the transactions [re-
flected in the sought-after documents] in the obscurity from which a 
trial will draw them, or it must expose them fully.”261 
 This quasi-waiver theory is hard to apply to the Johnson facts. It 
was the state, not the Federal Government, that initiated the crimi-
nal prosecution of Johnson.262 But it was the Federal Government, 
not the state, from which Johnson sought evidence. When the 
Federal Government refused to honor Johnson’s subpoenas, it did so 
not on the basis of any state regulations but on the basis of its own 
regulations.263 It cannot be argued that the State of California, by ini-
tiating a criminal case against Samuel Johnson, had “waived” the ef-
fect of regulations propounded by the United States Department of 
Justice. The State of California is without power to waive the effect 
of federal law.  
 Perhaps the Johnson court meant to suggest that merely by par-
ticipating so actively and directly in the state’s prosecution of John-
son the federal authorities waived the benefit of their own regula-
tions; a kind of waiver by proxy, or Andolschek-once-removed. If so, 
this is a novel interpretation of Andolschek—novel, but not unrea-
sonable. True, the State of California cannot waive on behalf of the 
Federal Government the benefit that the Federal Government de-
rives from its own lawfully enacted regulations. But by the same to-
ken, federal authorities ought not to work cheek-by-jowl with their 
state colleagues in accumulating evidence for a state criminal prose-
cution and then cache that evidence behind the Code of Federal 
Regulations to prevent the defendant from gaining access to it. 
                                                                                                                    
 257. Andolschek, 142 F.2d at 504. 
 258. Id.  
 259. Id. at 505. 
 260. Id. It appears that the regulations in question, rather than conditioning produc-
tion of the documents upon a defendant’s submission of a statement of his reasons for 
wanting the documents, simply barred production outright. 
 261. Id. at 506. 
 262. Johnson v. Reno, 92 F. Supp. 2d 993, 994 (N.D. Cal. 2000). 
 263. Id. at 995. 
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 The jurisprudence of Johnson is novel in other ways. The opinion 
nowhere mentions the Sixth Amendment, nor the right to compul-
sory process. The opinion mentions more than once a criminal defen-
dant’s constitutional entitlement to exculpatory evidence.264 Johnson 
quite properly cites Brady v. Maryland265 as first setting forth that 
constitutional entitlement. In Brady, the Supreme Court held “that 
the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an ac-
cused upon request violates due process where the evidence is mate-
rial either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or 
bad faith of the prosecution.”266 Apparently, then, it was Samuel 
Johnson’s Fifth Amendment right to due process of law,267 and not 
his Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process, that the Johnson 
court purported to vindicate. The Sixth Amendment compulsory 
process right remains the red-headed stepchild of constitutional 
criminal procedure. 
 Johnson was fortunate, not just because he obtained relief, but be-
cause he obtained relief seasonably. The federal agencies were 
obliged to produce their evidence to him pretrial, when his lawyers 
could evaluate that evidence and determine what if any use to make 
of it. The next Samuel Johnson may learn only on the eve of trial, or 
perhaps after trial has already begun, of the existence of a crucial 
piece of evidence in the hands of a federal agency. For such a defen-
dant there will probably be, on the present state of the law, no relief 
and no justice. The mere issuance of a subpoena will get him nothing. 
Appending to that subpoena the statement or affidavit required by 
federal regulations will assure him only that in the fullness of time 
someone will consider his subpoena. Beyond that, there is the pros-
pect—citing Johnson—of an action under the APA. But time and tri-
als wait for no man. 
 A criminal defendant in state court has a right, by operation of the 
Federal Constitution, to compulsory process. Yet federal agencies, by 
interposing the sovereignty of the Federal Government, can effec-
tively frustrate that right. At the end of the day, the state court de-
                                                                                                                    
 264. Id. (stating that Johnson was entitled “to obtain relevant materials that would, in 
a federal criminal trial, be discoverable under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963),” i.e., 
“information that is . . . exculpatory”; federal agencies were ordered to produce “[a]ll wit-
ness statements made that . . . contain exculpatory information”). It is not only defendants 
in federal criminal trials who are entitled to exculpatory information under Brady. As dis-
cussed in the text, Brady is an interpretation of the constitutional guarantee to due process 
of law, applicable to state as well as federal criminal defendants. Id. 
 265. 373 U.S. at 83. 
 266. Id. at 87. The Brady doctrine has since been refined in cases such as United States 
v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985); and Kyles v. 
Whitely, 514 U.S. 419 (1995). 
 267. “No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. V. See also U.S. CONST amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”). 
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fendant has no reliable, practical remedy—unless state trial judges 
are prepared to engage in the wholesale dismissal of cases in which 
defendants seek, but are denied, access to testimony and evidence 
from federal actors.268 
VI.   CONCLUSION 
 On the occasion of Touhy’s fiftieth anniversary, the jurisprudence 
it has engendered is in a state of unexampled chaos. A statute in-
tended to empower executive agency heads to maintain in good order 
the books, records, and evidentiary artifacts of their agencies has 
been interpreted by some federal courts as vesting in those agency 
heads an unreviewable power to defeat any exercise of the compul-
sory process right expressly guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.269 
Other federal courts have given Touhy a much narrower reading, 
recognizing, for example, that it says nothing at all about testimo-
nial, as opposed to documentary, evidence.270 Still other federal 
courts continue to debate the scope and meaning of Touhy.271 As 
Oliver Hardy is widely but incorrectly believed to have said to Stan 
Laurel, “Here’s another fine mess you’ve gotten us into!”272 
 One hundred years ago Wigmore could write that, “[f]or three 
hundred years it has now been recognized as a fundamental maxim 
that the public (in the words sanctioned by Lord Hardwicke) has a 
right to every man’s evidence.”273 By operation of the Sixth Amend-
                                                                                                                    
 268. In EPA v. General Electric Co., 197 F.3d 592 (2d Cir. 1999), the Second Circuit 
suggested that the inefficiency of the APA as a remedy could be ameliorated in a federal 
case by permitting the district judge before whom the underlying lawsuit is pending to re-
view, as if in an independent APA action, the dishonoring of a subpoena by a federal actor 
pursuant to departmental regulations. That short-cut is unavailable when the trial is in a 
state court. 
 269. See, e.g., United States v. Gentry, No. 92-CR588, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5517 
(N.D. Ill. Apr. 27, 1995). See generally Tholen Supply Co. v. Cont’l Cas., 859 F. Supp. 467, 
469 (D. Kan. 1994); Ferrell v. Yarberry, 848 F. Supp. 121, 123 (E.D. Ark. 1994); Dent v. 
Packerland Packing Co., 144 F.R.D. 675, 678 (D. Neb. 1992). 
 270. See, e.g., Louisiana v. Sparks, 978 F.2d 226 (5th Cir. 1992); Giancana v. Johnson, 
335 F.2d 372 (7th Cir. 1964). See generally Golden Pac. Bancorp v. FDIC, No. 99-3799, 
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20303 (D.N.J. 1999); Smith v. C.R.C. Builders Co., 626 F. Supp. 12 
(D. Colo. 1983). 
 271. Compare Smith v. Cromer, 159 F.3d 875 (4th Cir. 1998), with id. at 889 (Phillips, 
Sr. J., dissenting); compare Davis Enters. v. EPA, 877 F.2d 1181 (3d Cir. 1989), with id. at 
1189 (Weis, J., dissenting). The Eastern District of Louisiana has met itself coming and go-
ing. Compare United States v. Cleveland, No. 96-207, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7359 (E.D. 
La. May 21, 1997), with Landry v. FBI, No. 97-197, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9850 (E.D. La. 
July 3, 1997). 
 272. He never actually said it. He did say, “Here’s another nice mess you’ve gotten me 
into.” Another Fine Mess was the title of a 1930 Laurel & Hardy short film. Hardy did use 
the expression “another fine mess” in a pilot recording for a radio series. See BBC, A Brief 
Introduction to Laurel & Hardy, at http://www.bbc.co.uk/dna/h2g2/alabaster/A727355 (last 
visited Apr. 11, 2002) (on file with author). 
 273. WIGMORE, supra note 11, § 2192. This “fundamental maxim” is one that courts in 
our own time seem never to tire of repeating. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 
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ment, every member of the public who is prosecuted in federal court 
has a right to every man’s evidence. 
 The simplest case for the proper application of Touhy is that of Jill 
Defendant, supra page 82. A federal agent—one whose involvement 
in the case as a percipient witness is not denied—is subpoenaed by 
the defense to give testimony at trial. Touhy has nothing to say about 
this case. The authorities cited by Touhy have nothing to say about 
this case. No statute that has been enacted, and no statute or regula-
tion that could be enacted consistent with the Constitution, has any-
thing to say about this case. Jill’s right to compel the testimony of the 
witness cannot, on any rational interpretation of the Sixth Amend-
ment or the Touhy jurisprudence, be defeated. 
 Only slightly more difficult is the case in which Jill issues a sub-
poena, not for testimony, but for physical or documentary evidence. 
The “housekeeping” statute lawfully empowers the head of an execu-
tive agency or department to make a definitive identification of the 
custodian of records of his agency or department—a determination 
that, by operation of the “housekeeping” statute, even the federal 
courts must respect. Undoubtedly the head of an executive agency or 
department can, as a function of his power to designate a custodian 
of records, affix merely ministerial conditions to the process of sub-
poena compliance, e.g. “time, place, and manner” restrictions, so long 
as they are not unreasonable or inconsistent with rules of federal 
procedure. But a condition of compliance that Jill state the reason for 
her subpoena is unreasonable, not supported by Touhy, and at odds 
with Jill’s attorney’s work-product privilege. 
 There is no basis for any suggestion that, absent stringent regula-
tions such as those appearing at 28 C.F.R. § 16.22-16.29, federal 
agencies will be unable to protect themselves from a tidal wave of 
frivolous or unfairly burdensome subpoenas. The telephone company 
and other public utilities, bereft of any power to propound regula-
tions, routinely respond to many and varied subpoenas directed to 
their custodians of records without being overwhelmed. Businesses 
large and small in heavily regulated industries are likewise subject 
to extensive visitorial process. If a subpoena directed to a federal 
agent or agency is overbroad, vexatious, or calls for privileged or con-
fidential materials, the federal respondent has the same remedies 
available to him as does any other recipient of a subpoena. To sug-
gest that federal agencies, stripped of the armor of their regulations, 
will be defenseless against the slings and arrows of outrageous sub-
                                                                                                                    
674 (1972); United States v. Simmons, 215 F.3d 737, 741 (7th Cir. 2000); In re Grand Jury 
Subpoena, 112 F.3d 910, 917 (8th Cir. 1997); NLRB v. Joseph Macaluso, Inc., 618 F.2d 51, 
54 (9th Cir. 1980); Folb v. Motion Picture Indus. Pension & Health Plans, 16 F. Supp. 2d 
1164, 1171 (C.D. Cal. 1998); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 406 F. Supp. 381, 385 (S.D.N.Y. 
1975). 
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poenas is to suggest that such federal agencies are without recourse 
to the federal courts. 
 To restore the Sixth Amendment to its rightful place in federal 
criminal litigation, no more is needed than a consistently proper (and 
properly narrow) reading of Touhy by federal courts. Much more 
than a return to the original understanding of Touhy, however, will 
be necessary to resolve the Gordian problem of the state court crimi-
nal defendant who seeks to compel evidence or testimony from a fed-
eral source. 
 The subpoena propounded by the state court criminal defendant 
issues in the name of the state. Although the defendant’s right to 
such a subpoena is assured by the Federal Constitution, such a sub-
poena is without power to compel the federal sovereign or its agents. 
 Sovereign immunity is waived to the extent, and within the terms, 
of the APA. The APA has proven adequate to the needs of civil liti-
gants, such as those involved in the Exxon litigation.274 But civil liti-
gation, state or federal, is heavily weighted toward pretrial practice. 
Depositions, interrogatories, requests for production and other such 
discovery devices, by means of which a litigant may learn the iden-
tity and potential testimony of witnesses, and of the existence and lo-
cation of physical or documentary evidence, are largely unknown to 
criminal practice. Additionally, the relatively slower pace of civil liti-
gation, always undertaken with one eye on structuring a settlement 
in lieu of trial, affords time and opportunity to pursue an APA claim. 
Trial preparation in a criminal case is conducted at a forced-march 
pace, while constitutional and statutory “speedy trial” clocks tick and 
harried judges bark about docket congestion. Possessed of few dis-
covery devices and little preparation time, the state court criminal 
defendant may learn only on the courthouse steps the name of a key 
federal witness, or the existence of a crucial piece of evidence in fed-
eral custody. A subpoena unaccompanied by a statement of the de-
sired evidence and its relevance will not be honored. A subpoena ac-
companied by such a statement (which statement is undeniably a 
waiver of work-product privilege) may, or may not, be honored. It 
would be a rare trial judge indeed who would be willing to continue 
for months a trial that had already begun, or was about to begin, in 
order to afford the defendant an opportunity to litigate, pursuant to 
the APA, a separate claim that an agency’s rejection of his subpoena 
was an abuse of discretion. Samuel Johnson’s successful pursuit of 
federally-held evidence for use in his state criminal case appears to 
make him unique, or nearly so, among state court criminal defen-
dants. 
                                                                                                                    
 274. E.g., SeaHawk Seafoods, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., No. A89-0095-CV (D. Alaska 1989); 
Exxon Valdez Litig., 3AN-89-2533CI (Alaska Super. Ct. 1989). 
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 As noted above, this is an injustice that cannot be remedied sim-
ply by a judicial re-reading of Touhy. Nor is it a problem that will 
just go away. The use of law enforcement “task forces” combining 
federal, state, and local agencies in response to interstate and inter-
national criminal activity will likely increase the number of instances 
in which federal hands will hold evidence needed by a state defen-
dant. Whether Congress could ever vest state judges with concurrent 
jurisdiction over APA claims is a question of constitutional law the 
resolution of which is unnecessary for purposes of this article; in any 
event, Congress has not attempted to vest such jurisdiction in state 
courts and gives no sign of intending to do so. 
 As a practical matter, then, the only remedy presently available to 
the criminal defendant in state court is outright dismissal of the case 
against him. It is a remedy that courts are understandably reluctant 
to provide. A raft of orders dismissing charges against habitual of-
fenders for reasons having nothing to do with the merits of those 
charges is not the sort of thing with which a state judge wants to be 
confronted come election time. But the inability of a state defendant 
to enforce his subpoena frustrates more than that defendant’s consti-
tutional rights; it also frustrates the state court’s truth-seeking func-
tion. If, in the view of the trial judge, the absence of a federal witness 
or the lack of federally-held evidence undermines the truth-seeking 
function of the trial sufficiently, dismissal is not merely justice to the 
defendant but justice writ large. Like the witness in Leviticus, the 
federal agent or employee has heard the “voice of adjuration.” If he 
ignores it, then he—not the trial judge, not the defendant—must 
bear his iniquity. 
